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“Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to
waive, their rights under [the Family and Medical Leave Act].” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the language in the above regulation appears to prohibit
employees from waiving their rights under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), state and federal courts have recently wrestled with
the meaning of the phrase. Some courts have come to the conclusion
that it allows employee waivers in severance agreements. 2 The Fourth
Circuit and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal are currently split on the issue
of FMLA waivers, and debate continues over the exact meaning of the
phrase and what interpretation best serves the purposes and goals of the
FMLA. 3

1. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2007) (implementing regulations under the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2000)).
2. See, e.g., Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2003)
(finding that 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 does not prohibit waiver of FMLA rights); Schoenwald
v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., No. 98-35195, 1999 WL 685954, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 1999)
(holding FMLA claim foreclosed due to employee’s ratification of a release); Simonton
v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., No. 05-6123-CV-SJ-FJG, 2006 WL 3386564, at
*3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2006) (finding no impediment to a release agreement).
3. See Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2005), aff’d
on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S.
Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539); Faris, 332 F.3d at 321 (holding waivers enforceable).
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In the FMLA, Congress enacted the first national family and medical
leave legislation in the United States. 4 It was passed in response to both
the increasing number of households in which single parents or both
parents worked, and the lack of employment policies to accommodate
the parents. 5 This reality put parents in the undesirable position of a
forced choice between job security and parenting.6 Thus, the Act requires
employers with over fifty employees to provide eligible employees 7 up
to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year (1) to care for a newborn, a
newly adopted child, or a newly placed foster child; (2) to care for a
child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition; or (3) to treat
one’s own serious health condition. 8 Along with these substantive leave
rights, the Act also created proscriptive rights prohibiting employers
from discriminating or retaliating against employees when they return
from leave or otherwise exercise their substantive FMLA rights. 9
The text of the FMLA does not explicitly permit or forbid employees
to waive their rights to pursue or settle potential claims under the Act. 10
Congress has, however, directed the Secretary of Labor to issue
regulations necessary to carry out the statute, 11 which the Department of
Labor (DOL) promulgated in 1995 in section 825 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.12 Section 825.220(d) in the Regulations addresses protection
of employees who requested leave or asserted rights under the FMLA,
stating that “[e]mployees cannot waive, nor may employers induce
4. Jane Waldfogel, Family and Medical Leave: Evidence from the 2000 Surveys,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 2001, at 17, 17.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000).
6. Id.
7. An “eligible employee” is generally one who has been employed for at least
twelve months by the employer from whom leave is requested, and has worked at least
1250 hours for that employer during the previous twelve-month period. The Act does
not cover certain federal officers or employees, or employees at a worksite at which the
employer employs less than fifty employees if the total number of employees employed
by the employer within seventy-five miles of that worksite is less than fifty. Id. §
2611(2).
8. Id. § 2612(a)(1). Additional substantive rights also include the right to take
leave on an intermittent basis or to a reduced work schedule when medically necessary,
and the right to reinstatement. Id. §§ 2612(b), 2614(a).
9. Id. § 2615.
10. Id. §§ 2601–54; Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir.
2005), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W.
3226 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2000) (authorizing the Secretary to prescribe such
regulations as are necessary to carry out the FMLA).
12. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100–825.800 (2007).
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employees to waive, their rights under [the] FMLA.” 13 As previously
noted, judicial interpretations of the regulation have been inconsistent. 14
The Fifth Circuit allowed such a release in Faris v. Williams WPC-I,
Inc., distinguishing FMLA “rights” from “claims,” 15 while other courts
have drawn no such distinction and allow employees to pursue redress
for alleged violations despite agreeing to not do so as part of a severance
agreement. 16 As the United States Supreme Court and Congress have
not yet spoken on this issue, the enforceability of FMLA waivers in
employee severance agreements will continue to be questioned and
litigated, and will lead to uncertainty in the context of employeremployee rights under the Act. 17

13. Id. § 825.220(d).
14. Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 05-2336, 2006 WL 2529632, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2006) (holding waivers of rights to sue for FMLA violations are
unenforceable), vacated, 2007 WL 1165068, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007). But cf.
Halvorson v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. 99-5021, 2000 WL 571933, at *3 (6th Cir. May 3,
2000) (enforcing general release of FMLA, Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
and Americans with Disabilities Act claims).
15. 332 F.3d 316, 320–22 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding prohibition on waiving “rights”
refers to prospective substantive rights under FMLA, not to causes of action for
exercising those rights or for money damages).
16. See, e.g., Dougherty, 2006 WL 2529632, at *7 (denying motion for summary
judgment on grounds that FMLA rights are not waivable in a severance agreement);
Dierlam v. Wesley Jessen Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(invalidating severance agreement waiver of FMLA rights).
17. In response to various concerns, in February 2006 the DOL requested public
comment regarding the effectiveness of the FMLA implementing regulations. Request
for Information on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,504,
69,504–05 (Dec. 1, 2006). The nonexhaustive list of issues for which the DOL sought
comment included “whether a limitation should be placed on the ability of employees to
settle their past FMLA claims,” or the waiver issue. Id. at 69,509–10. Comments were
initially due February 2, 2007. Id. at 69,505. In February 2008, the DOL proposed new
FMLA rules and again requested public comment. The Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7876 (Feb. 11, 2008); see also infra note 118.
One of the most hotly debated issues included in the notice was the meaning of
a “serious health condition,” which is required to take leave under the Act. See 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce wants to narrow the
eligible medical conditions and require more documentation regarding the health
condition. Molly Selvin, Family Leave Act Being Reviewed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at
C1. As one lawyer put it, some employees view the FMLA as a “‘get out of jail free’
card on attendance issues.” Id. The National Partnership for Women and Families, on
the other hand, believes that toughening the law will make it harder for people with
legitimate medical needs to take leave. Id. The group cautions that “[w]e need to be
careful not to address discipline problems through regulation.” Cindy Skrzycki, Door
Opens to Changes in Family Leave, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2006, at D01. For more on
the argument that changing the regulations is unnecessary, see John E. Matejkovic &
Margaret E. Matejkovic, If It Ain’t Broke . . . Changes to FMLA Regulations Are Not
Needed; Employee Compliance and Employer Enforcement of Current Regulations Are,
42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 413 (2006). The DOL may or may not take any action in
response to the public input. According to Victoria Lipnic, Assistant Secretary for the
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While various arguments suggest that FMLA waivers are best
analyzed as valid private contracts, 18 many public policy concerns
caution against this blanket enforcement. 19 Employees asserting their
FMLA rights are often facing family or medical crises, which may make
them particularly emotionally and financially vulnerable. 20 Studies also
show that many employees are not familiar with their FMLA rights, and
may, to their detriment, waive rights to pursue claims they did not realize
existed.21 Also, allowing employers to purchase waivers of their past
violations, which were possibly flagrant and harmful, only encourages
employers to ignore the Act and fosters a contentious workplace. 22
After years of congressional debate and overcoming two presidential
vetoes, Congress surely did not intend to allow employers to
systematically violate FMLA provisions intended to aid the nation’s
families. 23 Prohibiting private employee FMLA waivers in severance
Employment Standards Administration of the DOL, “The point is to force some critical
thinking on a lot of issues.” Skrzycki, supra.
18. See infra Part III for discussion of arguments in favor of FMLA waivers,
including “freedom of contract” principles and a general preference for dispute
settlement rather than litigation.
19. Examples of these concerns include the high risk of employees’ unequal
bargaining power as to their employer, coercion of employees by employers, and
encouraging employers’ noncompliance with the FMLA.
20. For instance, an employee who requests leave to attend to a child’s serious
medical condition has likely been juggling doctors’ appointments, hospital visits, and
around-the-clock care with work responsibilities for some time prior to the request for
leave. Doctor and hospital bills have likely accumulated, and the employee fears the
impact of lost wages during leave. The employee is also emotionally drained from
worrying about the child’s medical problem, and from constant pressure to maintain
acceptable performance levels at work.
21. See infra Part III. This is contrary to freedom of contract principles which
require “perfect” information, as discussed in Part III.
22. Consider the situation where an employer illegally refuses to reinstate an
employee returning from leave to a position comparable to the one previously held. The
employer instead persuades her after two months to accept a severance agreement in
which the employer pays her two months’ salary in exchange for a contractual promise
to not pursue any claims against the employer. After obtaining the waiver, the employer
is emboldened in realizing it can easily purchase waivers of FMLA liability from its
employees. The employer no longer intends to comply with certain provisions of the Act
which the employer believes are too favorable to employees. Other employees in the
workplace witnessed the employer’s FMLA violation, and empathized with the former
employee as she complained for two months of her maltreatment. These employees now
have a growing hostility toward the employer because they blame it for the employee’s
departure, as well as for their own reluctance to now assert FMLA rights for fear of
being “pushed out” of their job. The result is tension in the workplace.
23. The Act was vetoed twice by former President George H.W. Bush, but signed
into law by President Clinton. Charles L. Baum, Has Family Leave Legislation Increased
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agreements allays concerns of employee coercion and exploitation by
employers, encourages FMLA compliance, and promotes the stability
and economic security of families by enabling employees to reap the
benefits of the Act.
This Comment addresses whether a waiver of rights in an employee
severance agreement which bars an employee from pursuing FMLA
claims against an employer should be a valid and enforceable contract
provision. Part II examines the history and purposes of the FMLA,
which give rise to public policy arguments against FMLA severance
agreement waivers. Part III explores some of the arguments that have
been offered in support of FMLA waivers, and the various shortcomings
of these purported justifications. Part IV turns to the many arguments
against enforceability, and principally the “anti-waiver approach” which
would make FMLA waivers illegal. Finally, Part V concludes that the
anti-waiver approach should be adopted, or, in the alternative, that
waivers should be enforceable only after the agreement is scrutinized by
a court or the Secretary of Labor, or the waiver meets heightened and
explicit waiver requirements. The FMLA reflects that it is “neither fair
nor necessary to ask working Americans to choose between their jobs
and their families.” 24 The approaches offered in this Comment would
encourage FMLA compliance by not allowing employers to easily
contract around their obligations under the Act—obligations which are
vital to ensuring that employers do not force employees to make unfair
and unnecessary choices between what are often the two most important
aspects of their lives.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF THE FMLA
The enactment of the FMLA in 1993 brought the United States “up to
speed” with the many other industrialized nations which already had
national family and medical leave programs. 25 The Act reflected
Leave-Taking?, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 93, 94 (2004).
24. Statement on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 50, 51 (Feb. 5, 1993) [hereinafter Clinton Signing Statement].
25. See Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 17 (noting that pre-FMLA, the United States
was an outlier among industrialized countries in that it had no national family and
medical leave legislation). President Clinton welcomed the legislation in his signing
statement accompanying the FMLA and noted that it was “long overdue”: “Now, with
the signing of this bill, American workers in all 50 states will enjoy the same rights as
workers in other nations.” Clinton Signing Statement, supra note 24, at 51. However,
the United States may still be an outlier in the international community because over 120
countries provide paid parental leave, whereas the FMLA does not. Press Release, Int’l
Labour Org., More than 120 Nations Provide Paid Maternal Leave (Feb. 16, 1998),
available at http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/
Press_releases/lang--en/WCMS_008009/index.htm.
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congressional findings that the number of households in which the single
parent or both parents worked was significantly increasing. 26 Congress
was particularly concerned with these societal changes given that “it is
important for the development of children and the family unit that
fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing and the
care of family members who have serious health conditions.”27 Congress
found that the lack of adequate employment policies to accommodate
working parents forced a choice between job security and parenting, and
that primary caretaking responsibilities often fell upon women, thus
affecting the working lives of women more so than those of men. 28 As
for individuals, it was noted that employees who were temporarily
prevented from working due to serious health conditions also faced
inadequate job security. 29 In light of these findings, Congress set out to
“balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to
promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote
national interests in preserving family integrity” through the provisions
of the FMLA. 30
As of 2000, the FMLA covered 10.8% of private businesses in the
United States and more than half of the country’s employees. 31 In
addition, 16.5% of all employees took leave in the eighteen months prior

26. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (2000).
27. Id. § 2601(a)(2).
28. Id. § 2601(a)(3), (a)(5).
29. Id. § 2601(a)(4).
30. Id. § 2601(b)(1). Many stories show the extent to which the FMLA helps
families. For example, Patti Phillips was able to accompany her eighteen-year-old
daughter through years of treatment for bone cancer, and was able to sit by her
daughter’s bedside the day she was going to go to sleep for a little while but never
awoke. “You want to be there with your child, especially when it’s terminal, and you
don’t want to worry about your job. . . . The law gives you peace of mind,” she said.
Stephanie Armour, Family, Medical Leave Act at Center of Hot Debate, USA TODAY,
May 26, 2005, at B1. A columnist also enjoyed the benefits of the Act and said that
taking leave to care for his newborn son was:
[T]he most rewarding month of my life. . . . [M]y son had a healthier and
happier start in life because of it.
. . . [E]very working parent should have the right to bond with a child
when it counts most, when they need help with everything from feeding to
learning how to grasp a pacifier.
Daniel Vasquez, Parents, Let’s Fight to Preserve the Family Medical Leave Act, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 2007, at 10A, available at 2007 WLNR 2710499.
31. Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 19. This is consistent with the fact that “far more
employees work for large businesses than small ones.” Mary E. Forsberg, Perspective
on Family Leave, N.J. POL’Y PERSP., Jul. 2001, http://njpp.org/rpt_familyleave.html.
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to the 2000 DOL survey, as did a near equal percentage in 1995. 32 The
data shows that the FMLA has an expansive reach, and resolution of the
waiver issue posed by varying interpretations of section 825.220(d)
could potentially affect a majority of the employees in the country.
Furthermore, if judicial enforcement of releases is contrary to the public
interest, the aggregate effect on the public would be considerable given
the large numbers of employees covered by the FMLA. 33
III. THE CASE FOR ENFORCING FMLA SEVERANCE
AGREEMENT WAIVERS
A. Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc. and the Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation
of the Plain Language of Section 825.220(d)
In holding waivers enforceable, the Fifth Circuit was the first federal
appellate court to assert a position on the FMLA severance agreement
waiver issue. 34 In Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., a former employee
unsuccessfully challenged a post-termination release of claims under
section 825.220(d). 35 Faris, an occupational health specialist, had
worked for a company for over a year and a half when her supervisor
fired her, citing poor performance. 36 That same day she was offered

32. Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 20.
33. While the FMLA covers eligible “employees,” like many antidiscrimination
and labor statutes, it does not cover independent contractors. This leaves a large portion
of the workforce uncovered. See Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to
Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor
Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 179–80 (2006). Tarantolo notes that the lack of coverage
of independent contractors in antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII is particularly
troubling because the contingent workforce is lower paid and therefore more at risk of
falling into poverty if they lose their jobs. Id. at 173–74. It is also worrisome because
contingent workers are more likely than traditional workers to be female and black or
Hispanic, making them more likely to be targets of workplace discrimination. Id. at 174.
The prevalence of women might be explained by women choosing more flexible
schedules to accommodate their family caretaking responsibilities, or because women
have been segregated into the lower-skilled and lower-paying jobs of the contingent
workforce. Id. at 178. Regardless of the reason, the fact that Congress enacted the
FMLA after finding that family caretaking responsibilities often affect the lives of
working women more so than those of men suggests that a definition of eligibility that
includes independent contractors may be appropriate to serve the FMLA policy goals.
For more on the “black hole” of regulatory protections for contingent workers, see
Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting The Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153
(2003).
34. See Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2003).
35. Id. at 318. As previously noted, section 825.220(d) states that “employees
cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under [the]
FMLA.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2007).
36. Faris, 332 F.3d at 318.
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$4,063.32 to sign a release of “all other claims arising under any other
federal, state or local law or regulation.” 37 She received a memorandum
stating she had forty-five days to consider the release and seven days to
revoke it if she signed. 38 She signed the agreement and accepted the
money, but later sued her former employer alleging that she was fired in
retaliation for asserting her FMLA rights. 39 Following discovery at trial,
the defendants moved for summary judgment as to the enforceability of
the release. 40 Faris moved for partial summary judgment on whether the
release was per se unenforceable under section 825.220(d). 41 The
district court denied the defendants’ motion and granted Faris’s, holding
that the plain language of section 825.220(d) forbade waiving FMLA
rights. 42
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the defendants argued that the plain
language of section 825.220(d) did not apply to post-termination FMLA
claims. 43 They argued that the term employee in the regulation
implicitly refers only to current employees, not to former ones, and also
that the regulation applies only to substantive rights and not to causes of
action.44 Alternatively, they argued that if section 825.220(d) is ambiguous,
then “relevant law under similar statutory schemes” and the “common
law presumption of and favor toward waivability” support a narrow
reading of the regulation. 45
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendants that the proper reading
was that the regulation does not apply to post-dispute claims for damages

37. Id. This was the equivalent of one month’s salary.
38. However, demonstrating the possibility of coercion that will be discussed
infra, Faris claimed she was pressured into signing the release when she was confronted
by her supervisor and another employee and told, “This is your last opportunity to sign
the release if you expect to get compensation for it.” Id. at 318 & n.1.
39. Id. at 316, 318.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The district court certified the questions of law addressed in its summary
judgment order, and the Fifth Circuit granted the defendants leave to bring the
interlocutory appeal. Id.
43. Id. at 319.
44. Id. at 319–20.
45. Id. at 319. The defendants also argued that the regulation was invalid under
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The Fifth Circuit declined to consider this argument as it was not presented to nor passed
on by the district court. Faris, 332 F.3d at 319 n.2.
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under the FMLA. 46 The court reasoned that the phrase “rights under
FMLA” in section 825.220 only limited prospective waivers of
substantive rights such as FMLA leave and reinstatement. 47 The court
did not believe that the phrase applied to the FMLA cause of action for
prior violations. 48 The court noted that the statute and regulation
consistently use the phrase “rights under the FMLA” and “rights under
the law” to refer to statutory rights of leave and reinstatement under 29
U.S.C. § 2612 and 29 U.S.C. § 2614, respectively. 49 It also explained
that although the requirements constituting the cause of action in
§ 2615(a) are detailed in section 825.220, the regulation never “refers to
the cause of action for damages as a right under FMLA,” and the
regulation itself is titled, “How are employees protected who request
leave or otherwise assert FMLA rights?” 50 Concluding that the text
need be responsive to the title, the court found the plain language of
section 825.220 to not ban FMLA prospective claims waivers. In other
words, the court asserted that the cause of action is merely a protection
for FMLA rights. 51 Despite this semantics-driven analysis, the court’s
reasoning is weakened by its omission of the fact that section 825.220
also addresses nonsubstantive provisions that give rise to causes of
action.52 There are also probable shortcomings in the court’s suggestions

46. Faris, 332 F.3d at 319. The court also found that the term employee within
§ 825.220 does not unambiguously refer to former employees, and likely only extends to
current employees. Id. at 320. The court noted that the term is used in various contexts
in the statute to refer to only current employees, while in other situations it refers to
former employees. Id. However, other courts have found the FMLA does apply to
former employees. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 05-2336, 2006
WL 2529632, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2006) (stating that the court “cannot fathom the
Fifth Circuit’s narrow construction of § 825.220(d)”), vacated, 2007 WL 1165068, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007). The issue of whether or not the FMLA applies to former
employees remains in dispute, partially due to the Act’s unhelpful definition. The Act
defines employee by referencing the FLSA definition: “the term ‘employee’ means any
individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2000). In Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, the United States Supreme Court described this
definition, as applied under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, as
“completely circular and explain[ing] nothing.” 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992).
47. Faris, 332 F.3d at 320.
48. Id.
49. Id. For example, FMLA “rights” are associated with leave and reinstatement
in section 825.220(b), which states that “‘[i]nterfering with’ the exercise of an
employee’s rights would include, for example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA
leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b)
(2007).
50. Faris, 332 F.3d at 320–21.
51. Id. at 321. The Secretary of Labor recently adopted this view of a “rights” and
“claims” distinction in its brief arguing for rehearing of a Fourth Circuit decision which
held waivers unenforceable. See infra note 118.
52. See infra note 110 and accompanying text discussing 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).
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that public policy, freedom of contract, and the validity of ADEA and
Title VII waivers also supported its position.
B. Public Policy and Market Principles
In isolation, certain aspects of public policy and market principles may
seem to support FMLA waivers. The court in Faris, for example, claimed
its holding was “bolstered by public policy favoring the enforcement of
waivers,” though it did not elaborate on the assertion. 53 The court was
likely referencing the fact that public policy generally favors settlement
of disputes without litigation, and allowing an employer and employee
to resolve a FMLA claim through a private severance agreement serves
this end in some circumstances. 54 The court also presumably endorsed a
freedom of contract approach to the analysis of waivers. According to
freedom of contract principles, courts should enforce private contracts
between parties, including severance agreements and waivers, as they
promote individual autonomy and the efficiency of labor markets. 55
However, applying strict freedom of contract principles may “destabilize
personal, social, and community relationships and networks” because the
approach focuses on individual preferences rather than societal needs. 56
A strict freedom of contract approach, therefore, may be contrary to
public policy.
1. Freedom of Contract and Rational Choice
Freedom of contract rests on the notion that an individual’s autonomy
and preferences deserve recognition. 57 This parallels the theory of

53. Faris, 332 F.3d at 321.
54. See, e.g., Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976)
(stating that public policy strongly favors settlement of disputes without litigation).
55. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 951 (1984).
56. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 2 (1993)
(noting that market economies actually “depend on significant degrees of inequality to
give effective reign to individual incentives, . . . and thus may generate higher degrees of
inequality” than other modes of social organization); see also Deborah Zalesne,
Enforcing the Contract at All (Social) Costs: The Boundary Between Private Contract
Law and the Public Interest, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 579, 595–601 (2005)
(discussing possible negative effects on third parties when contracts are enforced in the
name of freedom of contract, and that various contract defenses such as unconscionability
inadequately mitigate these effects).
57. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 56, at 19–21.
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rational choice, in which individuals are viewed as rationally selfinterested and having “complete, transitive, and reasonably stable
preferences.” 58 They learn and compute the costs and benefits of
various courses of action, seeking to maximize as many of their
preferences as feasible. 59 After considering their options, they are then
presumed to choose the option that maximizes their subjective utility. 60
Viewing employers and employees as autonomous individuals capable
of making rational choices in their best interests would seemingly
support enforceable FMLA waivers. For example, an employer may
execute a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the time, expense,
publicity, and unpredictability of litigating an employee’s claim of
denial of adequate FMLA leave. The results may lead the employer to
conclude that it is in its best interest to “purchase” the employee’s
release from liability for these prospective claims. The cost of the waiver
may be rationally justified even when the employer knows the employee
is an “unlikely plaintiff,” given that the employer may know of or fear
unrevealed inculpatory information, an office full of potential witnesses
exists, and the employer enjoys future savings in not paying the
employee’s benefits. 61 For her part, the employee may well think it in
her best interest to receive an immediate cash payment, rather than incur
the time, expense, anxiety, and uncertainty of litigation. 62 Freedom of
contract suggests that courts should not interfere with the efficient
market and should hold these parties accountable to their contract. The
limits of this argument may quickly be reached, though. Whether the
employee’s decision is actually rational depends on whether the employee
has perfect information, as well as the abilities to process the information,
calculate consequences, and recall the information, which she often does

58. Thomas S. Ulen, The Prudence of Law and Economics: Why More Economics
Is Better, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 773, 794 (1996); see also Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice
and Rat Choice: Some Thoughts on the Relationship Among Rationality, Markets, and
Human Beings, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091, 1091–92 (2005). Rational choice theory
argues that people use instrumental reasoning to achieve their pre-established ends. The
theory holds that individuals will choose the best means to achieve their ends, and so
their choices are rational. Id.
59. Ulen, supra note 58, at 794.
60. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 213 (1995). See infra note 63 for limitations on employees’
abilities to make choices that achieve their best interests.
61. Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment
Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 492–93 (2001).
Employers are also “repeat players in these situations. Through experience or
counseling they have learned that lawsuits are expensive, emotionally draining, and
time-consuming—whether or not the underlying complaint has merit.” Id. at 492.
62. The employee’s choice is essentially “between guaranteed compensation and a
contingent right to additional payment if she is able to prove [her claim].” Id. at 492.
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not. 63 The argument also fails to consider situations where employees
underestimate risks of the agreement due to ignorance of their FMLA
rights. Finally, employee waivers of their rights to pursue claims under
the FMLA have an additional negative impact in that waivers remove
the incentive for an employer to comply with the legal requirements of
the FMLA. 64 For these reasons, complete freedom of contract may not
be well-suited to the employer-employee relationship. 65
2. The Agreement Timing
Waiver proponents can also argue that severance agreement waivers
are not problematic because, at the time of severance, an employee’s
focus is squarely on the realities of the agreement, which decreases the
likelihood of an involuntary or unknowing waiver. 66 A comparison of a

63. Eisenberg, supra note 60, at 214. Eisenberg explains this concept, referred to
as “bounded rationality,” and argues that actors often imperfectly process their options
due to limited information, and to limited abilities to process information, calculate
consequences, and utilize memory. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 155–56 for
discussion of imperfect information as related to FMLA rights.
64. For example, consider an employee who makes a valid request to care for his
ill wife. The employer refuses and tells the employee he will be fired if he misses work.
Months later the employee is fired for “poor performance,” and the employer offers him
a severance agreement on the condition that he waive his right to pursue the denial of his
leave request. By this time, the employee faces mounting medical bills, and he is
exhausted from working and caring for his wife over the past months. He takes the
money because he “could use it,” and he wants to focus on caring for his wife, although
when his wife recovers he may wish he could pursue litigation instead. The employer
now realizes it has no absolute need to comply with the FMLA because it felt little
impact from the recent violation. In the future, the employer plans to comply with the
Act for the most part, but recognizes that at some point its interests in productivity or
other business desires may lead it to deny leave or reinstatement. The employer will
“purchase” a waiver at severance in those instances.
65. As Catherine L. Fisk puts it: “In short, contract law has never been a perfect fit
for employment.” Catherine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and
the Ownership of Human Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765, 769 (2002). Fisk notes that the
long-term and informal nature of the employment relationship is at odds with the
traditional understanding of contract formation. The unequal information between the
parties and social norms “that make it difficult for employees to negotiate for the right to
keep their job unless they really screw up or for employers to announce to prospective
employees that they would like to be free to fire them arbitrarily” hamper negotiation.
Id. The risk of opportunistic behavior by both employees and employers is high, and
“devastating social policy consequences occur when one party can exploit its superior
market power at the expense of the other.” Id.
66. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2003) (noting that when a
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waiver at severance to one earlier in the employment stage illustrates
this point. Protectionist motives counsel against allowing employers to
secure, at hiring, prospective waivers of liability for all FMLA violations
the employer may commit in the future. Waivers in this context ask
employees to anticipate conflicts that have not occurred and to “evaluate
workplace practices in light of technical, perhaps unknown,
standards.” 67 It would be nearly impossible for an employee to know at
hiring if the employer is apt to violate FMLA provisions, or even if the
employee will need to take advantage of its entitlements. A new
employee is also optimistic at hiring and is unlikely to forecast what
would seem to be distant and abstract FMLA violations. However, at
severance the employee is more likely to focus her attention on the
employer’s incentives, the gamut of possible claims she may have, the
likelihood of proving her allegations, and the realistic consequences of a
waiver. 68 Additionally, at severance an employer likely can draft a more
detailed agreement with more specific terms and provisions, thus
reducing both the risks associated with an imperfect contract and reasons
to be hesitant to enforce it. 69
contract term is salient, the “market can be trusted to provide an efficient version of the
term”).
67. Silverstein, supra note 61, at 487 (contrasting waivers conditioned on
increased benefits, such as severance agreements, with settlement waivers made after
legal action was instituted where employee has had adequate time to “identify and
analyze the wrong done to her, assess the damage and calculate the money needed to
speed recovery”).
68. An employee’s consideration of possible claims is relevant to the “totality of
circumstances” test used by most federal circuits to determine whether a waiver of
federal employment claims was “knowing and voluntary.” See Craig Robert Senn,
Knowing and Voluntary Waivers of Federal Employment Claims: Replacing the Totality
of Circumstances Test with a “Waiver Certainty” Test, 58 FLA. L. REV. 305, 307–08
(2006). The factors dependent on the employee include:
[T]he employee’s education, background, and business experience; whether
the employee actually consulted with an attorney before signing the waiver;
the role that an employee played in deciding the terms of the agreement;
whether the employee actually knew or should have known of his or her
employment rights at the time of signing the waiver; and whether the employee
actually read and considered the waiver before signing it.
Id. at 308.
69. The specificity of the agreement is also relevant to the totality of circumstances
test discussed supra note 68. The employer-controlled factors of the test include: “using
clear, understandable waiver language; providing valuable consideration to the employee
in exchange for the waiver; affording the employee adequate time in which to review and
consider the waiver; and advising the employee to consult with an attorney prior to
signing the waiver.” Id. For example, the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA) of 1990, an amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) of 1967, includes among the express requirements of an enforceable waiver of
rights or claims under the Act that an agreement specifically refer to the rights or claims
arising under the chapter, not waive rights or claims that may arise after the waiver is
executed, and be written so that the individual and employer both understand it. 29
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Although waiver proponents could thus argue that an agreement at
severance ensures that employees have had sufficient time and information
to assess the waiver benefits and risks, this reasoning generally fails to
consider the effects on third parties. For one, the goals of encouraging
FMLA compliance are not adequately considered. The reasoning also
fails to take into account the impact of the waiver on remaining
employees who may then be less willing to assert FMLA rights.70
Therefore, even a knowing and voluntary waiver likely disserves the
FMLA goals of providing leave time to promote the stability and
economic security of families. 71
3. Autonomy
At first glance, autonomy and empowerment may also support
waivers. These characteristics are purportedly acquired when an
individual evaluates the worth of her claim and prefers and chooses an
immediate gain. In analyzing waivers from an autonomy framework,
Jessica Wilen Berg argues that waivers should be enforced when there is
an overall gain of autonomy, taking into account the autonomy lost from
giving up a right or claim. 72 She submits that government interference is
permissible only when individuals’ autonomous actions infringe on the
autonomy of others, or when government rules will result in greater
overall autonomy. 73 In the FMLA context, there may be an overall gain
U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2000). For example, the Ninth Circuit held that an OWBPA release
was not knowing and voluntary because it was not written in a “manner calculated” to be
understood by parties where a provision stated that “[t]his covenant not to sue does not
apply to actions based solely under [ADEA].” Syverson v. IBM Corp., 472 F.3d 1072,
1083–87 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added by the court). It was unclear whether ADEA
claims were covered by the release or excepted from it. Id.
70. See infra notes 76 and 131 and accompanying text.
71. Making rights less waivable, such as the “knowing and voluntary” requirements,
may also be insufficient to protect even the individual employee. According to Cynthia
L. Estlund, “[T]hose who are skeptical of employees’ ability to protect their interests
through contract find little comfort for employees—other than a modest gain in
transparency—in rights that can be waived and default rules that fill contractual gaps, for
employers often have little difficulty exacting waivers and filling gaps when it behooves
them to do so.” Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 379, 390 (2006).
72. Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 289 & n.32
(2003).
73. Berg, supra note 72, at 288–89. For example, government regulations on
maximum weekly work hours limit individual employees’ ability to “opt-out” of the
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of autonomy after the autonomous act of relinquishing rights. 74 An
employee who appraises a potential claim against her employer and
thoughtfully decides to waive her rights to pursue it in exchange for
compensation may well feel triumphant when she receives a check for
payment. Extracting money from her employer may make her feel
significant in the eyes of her employer, as she did not let it “get away”
with what she saw as an FMLA violation. 75 From an employee’s
perspective, the loss of autonomy in surrendering rights to pursue
claims is potentially overcome by the reaped monetary and self-worth
rewards, and the fact that whatever redress the employee envisioned as a
remote possibility in the court system is already achieved. However, the
employee will feel less autonomous if she later learns that she
undervalued a possible FMLA claim, or she learns after she signed a
waiver that her FMLA rights were violated. Government involvement is
then justified if the autonomy of a majority of employees who individually
agree to waivers is actually diminished, and illegalizing waivers would
increase overall autonomy. Furthermore, illegalizing waivers is possibly
justified because the effect of an individual employee waiving rights to
pursue FMLA claims likely extends beyond the “individual sphere” and
infringes on other employees’ autonomy.76 This consequence occurs when
coworkers are less willing to assert their own FMLA rights because they
are unaware that an employee, whose rights they saw violated, received
compensation as part of the waiver agreement.

protections, but do so because an “across-the-board-rule” is the only way to protect the
interests of all workers. Id. at 298–99. Individual exceptions are not permitted because
they would either undermine the purpose of the rule, which would implicate others’
autonomy, or because power inequities prevent the employee from making a truly
autonomous decision to waive the protections. Id. at 299.
74. This argument assumes that the employee believes that the money received is
payment for FMLA claims and not, for example, past wages or bonuses.
75. Autonomy is also an important aspect in other contractual contexts. For
example, premarital agreements serve the goal of increasing autonomy because
“[a]llowing couples to make marital contracts encourages them to think realistically
about the marriage, to anticipate and plan for contingencies, and to form relationships on
their own terms.” Rebecca Glass, Comment, Trading Up: Postnuptial Agreements,
Fairness, and a Principled New Suitor for California, 92 CAL. L. REV. 215, 250 (2004).
Concerns of infringement on individual autonomy also plague class action and mass tort
class action lawsuits in which plaintiffs relinquish individual decisionmaking authority to
bring an action as a class member. See Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put
Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002).
76. Berg, supra note 72, at 289–90 (recognizing that state interference is justified
to ensure that individuals have “freedom to act within the private realm” where one
individual’s autonomous action has implications beyond the “individual sphere”).
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Although public policy may favor settling disputes without litigation,77 it
does not favor settlements or enforcing waivers at all costs. Strictly
following freedom of contract principles and enforcing waivers in the
name of efficiency and individual autonomy likely creates more costs
than gains to the public. Permitting what may be a rational choice of
one employee to waive violations of FMLA rights removes an incentive
to the employer to abide by the Act, which is detrimental to other
employees. 78 In turn, the autonomy of other employees and their
willingness to assert their FMLA rights is lowered by individual employee
waivers. 79 As this public policy argument for enforcing settlements
ultimately fails as to FMLA waivers, so too do attempts to extend other
policies to the FMLA.
C. ADEA and Title VII Expressly Allow Waiver of Claims
Additional reasons suggested for allowing FMLA waivers have
included that both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
and the civil rights protections under Title VII protect individuals from
unlawful discrimination in employment, and each provide for potential
claimants to waive their rights under the respective acts. 80 It is
important to note that these similarities “[are] not necessarily
dispositive” of the waiver issue, 81 and also that distinguishing features
exist between these Acts and the FMLA.
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or labor organization to discriminate against an individual on the basis of
age. 82 The Act expressly allows “knowing and voluntary” waivers that

77. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. A severance agreement also differs
from a settlement in that the employee may have no knowledge of a dispute when
signing a severance agreement.
78. See infra note 131 and accompanying text, discussing the effect of waivers on
remaining employees and the effect on employer FMLA compliance.
79. See supra note 76 and accompanying text, discussing how an employee’s
waiver is apt to lower other employees’ autonomy and decrease their assertion of FMLA
rights.
80. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c)
(2000); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); see,
e.g., Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
court’s allowance of FMLA waivers is supported by the existence of similar waivers in
other regulatory contexts, including ADEA and Title VII).
81. Faris, 332 F.3d at 321.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c).
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meet explicit statutory requirements. 83 For an agreement to qualify as
“knowing and voluntary,” it must be written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the employee, and specifically refer to rights or claims
arising under the ADEA. 84 The employer must allow the employee at
least forty-five days to consider signing the agreement, and provide that
the agreement is revocable within seven days of signing. 85 Employers
must also advise employees to consult an attorney before making a
decision. 86
Title VII, similarly, makes it unlawful for an employer to “refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 87 Public policy favors voluntary settlement of Title VII
employment discrimination claims, so knowing and voluntary general
releases of claims arising from discriminatory incidents that occurred
during employment before execution of releases are typically valid. 88
Whether a Title VII release is knowing and voluntary is “not lightly to
be inferred,” and presumably requires a degree of specificity in the
waiver. 89 Given the similarity in protections and interpretations of the
FMLA, Title VII, and ADEA employment statutes, the court in Faris
found “no good reason . . . why the government would proscribe waiver
for FMLA retaliation claims and yet favor waiver of claims for age
discrimination under ADEA and for civil rights violations under [T]itle
VII.” 90 However, “good reasons” to proscribe FMLA waivers may
include that the FMLA has a unique purpose as compared with the other
statutes and that some of its protections do differ, which the court did not
examine.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which
enforces the federal laws prohibiting job discrimination, 91 also gave its
approval to settling discrimination claims through post-dispute agreements
83. Id. § 626(f).
84. Id. The agreement in Faris would not have met these requirements as the
waiver did not specifically refer to FMLA rights. See Faris, 332 F.3d at 318.
85. Faris, 332 F.3d at 318.
86. Id. See infra note 240 for all requirements.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
88. See, e.g., Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986)
(enforcing prospective waiver where woman knowingly and voluntarily agreed to accept
$800 in release of pursuing what she believed to be a valid discrimination claim).
89. Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1172 (5th Cir. 1976).
90. Faris, 332 F.3d at 322.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4; see also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n,
Federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Laws, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeo/overview
_laws.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2008). The EEOC is not involved in the enforcement of
the FMLA.
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entered into knowingly and voluntarily. 92 In a formal notice, the EEOC
made clear that it appreciated employees’ rights and its role in vindicating
the public interest in eradicating employment discrimination.93 The
Commission emphasized that employers may not interfere with the
protected rights of employees under Title VII, ADEA, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA),94 or the Equal Pay Act,95 as such interference
is contrary to public policy and is guarded against in the anti-retaliation
provisions of the statutes. 96 The Commission also recognized that
“individuals possess a non-waivable right to file charges with the EEOC.”97
With this in mind, the EEOC then stated that it supported employer and
employee efforts to voluntarily resolve employment disputes, and that
“[n]othing in this enforcement guidance diminishes the Commission
support for post-dispute agreements entered into knowingly and voluntarily
to settle claims of discrimination . . . .” 98 It is important to note, though,
that the focus of the EEOC notice is on “post-dispute” agreements,
which require that a dispute exist. FMLA severance agreement waivers,
on the other hand, are not limited to situations where a dispute has
arisen. 99
Several arguments appear to support enforcement of FMLA waivers.
First, the language of the Department of Labor regulation section
825.220, referring to “rights,” and not “claims,” could be interpreted to
permit waiving a specific cause of action. Secondly, freedom of contract
principles generally favor enforcement of private agreements. Finally,
the similarity between the FMLA and other antidiscrimination employment
statutes which allow waivers ostensibly support judicial enforcement of
92. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.002,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON NON-WAIVABLE EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC) ENFORCED STATUTES § III(C) (Apr.
10, 1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/waiver.html [hereinafter EEOC NOTICE].
93. Id.
94. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
95. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
96. EEOC NOTICE, supra note 92.
97. Id. Employers, therefore, would be “shielded against” any further recovery by
an employee where a valid waiver agreement or settlement exists. Id.
98. Id.
99. In other words, an FMLA waiver cannot be knowing and voluntary where no
dispute has arisen because “[t]he only way an employee can know the facts and
circumstances of the dispute, in order to make a knowing waiver, is after the dispute has
arisen.” Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of PostDispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 317
(2003).
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employees’ prospective waivers of FMLA claims. Despite these conceptions,
however, strong countervailing interests and opposing arguments weigh
against interpreting section 825.220(d) to allow waivers. In fact, enforcing
FMLA waivers may contravene public policy and may undermine the
purposes of the Act by giving employers incentives to violate its
provisions.
IV. THE FMLA ANTI-WAIVER APPROACH
The FMLA anti-waiver approach would make illegal all severance
agreement waivers of FMLA rights. Some courts already emphatically
refuse to recognize a FMLA severance agreement waiver as a valid
contractual abrogation of rights to sue under the Act. 100 Support for this
approach is found in the language, regulations, and administrative
history of the FMLA. 101 This approach also serves congressional goals
of achieving work and family life balance during times of need, while
avoiding problems of employee coercion. A discerning comparison of
the FMLA to other antidiscrimination legislation also reveals that the
similarities the statutes share do not compel enforcement of FMLA
waivers.
A. Plain Language
While the Faris court drew a distinction between “claims” and
“rights” in section 825.220(d), other courts just as confidently assert that
the phrase “[e]mployees cannot waive . . . their rights under [the] FMLA”
does not implicitly allow claim waivers, because the terms claims and
rights are interchangeable in this context. 102 These courts view the right
to seek redress for retaliation and discrimination as just as much a right

100. See, e.g., Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2005),
aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226
(U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539); see also Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1056
(8th Cir. 2006) (extending the Taylor rationale for invalidating prospective FMLA
waivers to Title VII prospective waivers); Brizzee v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., No. CV041566-ST, 2006 WL 2045857, at *11 (D. Or. July 17, 2006); O’Brien v. Star Gas
Propane, L.P., No. L-680-03, 2006 WL 2008716, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July
20, 2006).
101. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000) (including in text of FMLA no explicit
allowance of waivers); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2007) (stating that “[e]mployees cannot
waive . . . their rights under [the] FMLA”); The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6, 1995) (rejecting request to permit FMLA waivers in
preamble to the FMLA implementing regulations).
102. See, e.g., Taylor, 415 F.3d at 375. In Taylor, even the employer apparently did
not distinguish between “claims” and “rights” in the “General Release and Severance
Agreement” in which the employee purportedly signed away her rights under the FMLA.
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under the FMLA as the right to leave and reinstatement. 103 Furthermore,
the definitions of waive and waiver apply as much to prospective
contexts, such as the right to pursue a claim, as they do to substantive
This
contexts, as in the leave and reinstatement provisions. 104
undermines the Faris court rationale, for which the term waiver would
have to apply only to prospective uses and not retroactive uses for ripe
claims. 105
While the court in Faris tried to decipher the meaning of the
regulation through its own means, the United States Supreme Court has
developed a test for judicial review of an agency’s construction of a
statute rendered by the agency in charge of administering it, such as the
DOL, for the FMLA. 106 According to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., courts must first determine that
Congress and the statute itself are silent on the particular question at
issue, for if congressional intent is ascertainable, that intent governs and
“is the law” despite any differing administrative construction. 107
Because no such intent can be gleaned from the FMLA statute itself, the
question then becomes whether the agency’s construction is “based on a
permissible construction” of the statute. 108 The meaning of the DOL
construction of the statute must first be established before attempting to
answer this question.
The court in Faris placed much emphasis on the word rights in the
title of section 825.220, and relied on the tool of statutory construction
103. Id. After all, the right to leave and reinstatement is of questionable value if
there is not a commensurate right to seek redress for denial of those rights.
104. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1611 (8th ed. 2004) (defining waive as “[t]o
abandon, renounce, or surrender (a claim, privilege, right, etc.); to give up (a right or
claim) voluntarily”); see id. (defining waiver as “[t]he voluntary relinquishment or
abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or advantage; FORFEITURE”).
While not dispositive as to the meaning of section 825.220, the term waive is also often
used in reference to post-dispute settlement of claims. See, e.g., Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426–27 (1998) (discussing how the OWBPA limitations
on “waivers” are applicable to ADEA releases of “claims”).
105. See Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that “[a] plain reading of the regulation is that it prohibits prospective
waiver of rights, not the post-dispute settlement of claims”).
106. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
107. Id. at n.9. This Comment will not try to ascertain a specific congressional
intent from Congress’s silence, because “‘inferences from congressional silence,’ in the
context of administrative law, are often ‘treacherous.’” EEOC v. Seafarers Int’l Union,
394 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Castro v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 360 F.3d 721,
729 (7th Cir. 2004); Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2003)).
108. See supra text at note 10; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
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that what lies below the title is necessarily limited by it. 109 But the court
failed to mention that a provision under this title, preceding the antiwaiver provision, actually speaks to what the court deemed to be
nonsubstantive rights: namely that employers may not discriminate or
retaliate in employment actions such as hiring, firing, promoting, or
disciplining employees who take leave. 110 Thus, pursuing a claim for
discrimination or retaliation is appropriately interpreted as covered by
this title and is “otherwise assert[ing] FMLA rights.” 111 It is then
possible to view the regulation as limiting both substantive rights and
proscriptive rights, 112 with the anti-waiver provision applying to both.
Such an interpretation belies the Faris court conclusion that the
regulation does not pertain to or regulate waivers of proscriptive
claims. 113
Even if courts conclude that the DOL regulation does not prohibit
prospective waivers of FMLA claims, it does not follow that courts must
endorse the construction. According to the Supreme Court, the DOL
construction cannot be maintained if it is “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.” 114 At least one court has found that a
DOL construction of the regulation that forbids waivers, or follows the
The
anti-waiver approach, withstands the capriciousness test. 115
administrative history of the statute also sheds light on whether either
construction is permissible.

109. Faris, 332 F.3d at 321 (noting that the title is: “How are employees protected
who request leave or otherwise assert FMLA rights?” (emphasis added)); 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.220 (2007).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).
111. Id.
112. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 2005), aff’d on
reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct.
22, 2007) (No. 07-539). For example, the waiver ban would be viewed as extending to
substantive rights to leave and reinstatement and proscriptive rights to not incur FMLArelated discrimination or retaliation.
113. District courts have also addressed the claim versus right distinction with
mixed results regarding whether contract provisions restricting the statute of limitations
to bring FMLA claims are enforceable. While some courts held the provisions
unenforceable on the ground that section 825.220 bars interfering with employee “rights”
under the FMLA, see, e.g., Henegar v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 280 F. Supp. 2d 680,
682 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Lewis v. Harper Hosp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772–73 (E.D.
Mich. 2002), other courts hold the opposite. See, e.g., Badgett v. Fed. Express Corp.,
378 F. Supp. 2d 613, 625 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (finding that statutes of limitations exist to
protect defendants and are not claimant “rights”).
114. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
115. See, e.g., Taylor, 415 F.3d at 375.
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B. Administrative History of Section 825.220(d) and
Department of Labor Comments
The preamble to the implementing FMLA regulations specifically
addressed whether the Act envisioned valid severance agreement
waivers of FMLA claims. Prior to the implementation of the FMLA, the
DOL invited public comments while it formulated rules for the
legislation. 116 Several large businesses and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce took exception to the “no waiver” provision, and recommended
that the DOL adopt an explicit allowance of employee waivers in
settlement or severance agreements.117 The DOL considered the proposal
and proceeded to flatly reject it:
The Department has given careful consideration to the comments received on
this section and has concluded that prohibitions against employees waiving their
rights and employers inducing employees to waive their rights constitute sound
public policy under the FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards
statutes such as the [Fair Labor Standards Act]. 118

116. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180 (Jan. 6, 1995)
(preamble to the FMLA implementing regulations).
117. Id. at 2218. Nationsbank Corporation, Southern Electric International, Inc.,
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recommended “explicit allowance of waivers and
releases in connection with settlement of FMLA claims as part of a severance package.”
Id.
118. Id. In 2006, the DOL filed an amicus brief with the Fourth Circuit arguing for
rehearing of the Taylor decision, which found FMLA waivers unenforceable. See Brief
for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee’s Petition
for Rehearing En Banc, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007)
(No. 04-1525), available at http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/ taylor-08-16-2005.pdf
[hereinafter DOL Brief]. The Secretary of Labor contended that despite the clarity of the
implementing regulation statements, section 825.220 does not bar “retrospective
settlement of FMLA claims.” Id. at 4. The Secretary urged the court to adopt the
“rights” and “claims” distinction used by the Fifth Circuit. Id. The court later ordered
the Secretary to submit a supplemental brief addressing whether this new interpretation
was inconsistent with the initial DOL interpretation of the section. See Supplemental
Brief on Panel Rehearing for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Taylor v.
Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-1525) [hereinafter DOL
Supplemental Brief]. In its supplemental brief, the Secretary admitted that the preamble
accompanying the final FMLA regulations was the only public explanation the DOL had
issued on the FMLA waiver rule. Id. at 2. However, the Secretary claimed that its new
interpretation was “consistent” with the past one, and was entitled to controlling
deference despite the fact that it was first enunciated in a legal brief. Id. at 5. Even if the
interpretations are consistent, the discussion in supra note 114 and accompanying text
highlights that an agency’s interpretation need not be used if it is “arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.” In a July 2007 ruling, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
and reinstated its prior opinion, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.
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Such a straightforward rejection of any type of severance agreement
waiver led a district court in Dougherty v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc. to refuse to enforce a secretary’s severance agreement waiver, given
that “[a]ll parties appeared to acknowledge” that the regulation would
bar “soon-to-be-former employees” from waiving rights to recover for
FMLA violations that occurred during their employment. 119 The
explicitness of the DOL comments also led the district court to criticize
the Fifth Circuit for what it described as a “tortuously limited definition”
of the regulation in Faris. 120
In its comments in 1995, the DOL often compared the FMLA to the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), including an illustration of why it
concluded employees could not waive their FMLA rights. 121 The FLSA,
for its part, regulates the payment of overtime wages and requires
employers to pay statutory minimum wages to employees engaged in
commerce or the production of goods for commerce. 122 FLSA claims
for unpaid minimum wage or unpaid overtime can be settled or released
only by the DOL or with court approval. 123 As such, the Supreme Court
consistently holds that FLSA rights cannot be “bargained away” or
abrogated by contract as this would “nullify the purpose” of the
statute. 124 Given the DOL’s explicit intent for the FMLA to mirror the
FLSA as to the validity of releases of damages or claims, a strong
2005), once again holding that in the absence of DOL or court approval, section 825.220
bars prospective and retrospective waivers of FMLA rights. Taylor v. Progress Energy,
Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007). As this Comment was going to print, a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court was filed and awaits decision. Progress Energy, Inc. v.
Taylor, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539). Additionally, in February
2008, the DOL proposed to “clarify” the language in section 82.220(d), “in light of the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Taylor,” to provide that “employees and employers should
be permitted to voluntarily agree to the settlement of past claims without having to first
obtain the permission or approval of the [DOL] or a court,” denying that this would be a
change in the law. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7876, 7897
(Feb. 11, 2008). Public comments to the proposed rule are due April 11, 2008. Id. at
7876.
119. No. 05-2336, 2006 WL 2529632, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006).
120. Id.
121. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2185–86,
2218 (Jan. 6, 1995) (preamble to the FMLA implementing regulations).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2000). The FLSA reflected a congressional purpose to
protect “certain groups of the population from substandard wages and excessive hours
which endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of goods in
interstate commerce.” Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945) (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 2738, at 1, 13, 21, 28 (1938)).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000); Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 371
(4th Cir. 2005), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76
U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539).
124. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981); D.A.
Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114 (1946); see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S.
at 706–07.
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argument exists that it is appropriate for courts to strike down any
prospective waiver of FMLA claims as invalid and illegal.
C. The Public Interest is Harmed by the Enforcement
of FMLA Waivers
The notion of allowing individual employees to waive their FMLA
rights for private economic gains is disconcerting, given that the broad
public interest is clearly at the forefront of the Act, and “we all bear the
cost” when employees are not granted leave. 125 Individuals themselves
were not the intended beneficiaries of the FMLA. 126 The purpose of the
FMLA was expressly to promote national interests in preserving family
integrity and promoting the needs and stability of families. 127 In
addition, businesses that do not grant workers leave for family needs
“fail to establish a working environment that can promote heightened
productivity, lessened job turnover, and reduced absenteeism.” 128 It is
unlikely, then, that the Act is intended to endorse the monetary gain one
former employee receives from a waiver where it fosters continued
FMLA violations in that workplace. It is equally unlikely that the
government’s decreased ability to monitor the effectiveness of the Act,
due to the bypassing of litigation through waivers, serves the public
interest and the Act’s purposes.
There is serious concern that allowing FMLA waivers would hurt the
public interest by giving employers a “free pass,” or a slightly-morethan-free pass, to discriminate. An example of where the public interest
has been undermined involves the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
125. Clinton Signing Statement, supra note 24, at 51. President Clinton noted that
the cost falls upon everyone when employees are forced to choose between their jobs and
personal and family obligations.
When they must sacrifice their jobs, we all have to pay more for the essential
but costly safety net. When they ignore their own health needs or their family
obligations in order to keep their jobs, we all have to pay more for social
services and medical care as neglected problems worsen.
Id. An FMLA severance agreement waiver does not dispel these problems. For
instance, an employee whose medical problems worsened after her leave request was
denied may resort to public assistance to pay her medical bills. Had the employee taken
leave, the condition may have been easily treatable and less expensive.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000) (noting that the purpose of the FMLA is to balance
the needs of families, promote national interests, and to promote the goal of equal
employment for women and men).
127. Id.
128. Clinton Signing Statement, supra note 24, at 51.
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(OWBPA), a 1990 amendment to ADEA, under which employers who
meet statutory requirements are permitted to secure releases from
employees upon severance. 129 The systematic problem is that the waiver
will bar employees from bringing a suit which ripens when they later
learn they were replaced by younger workers, leading one commentator
to liken the waivers to a “license to discriminate.” 130 While FMLA
claims ripen during employment and so will not raise the same loophole
concerns as OWBPA, a form of a license to discriminate is still available
for purchase if waivers are enforced. For example, consider the situation
of an eligible employee who requests leave to care for an extremely ill
parent. If the employer knows that a waiver of FMLA rights will be
enforced, the employer might refuse to honor the employee’s leave
rights and instead plan to include a waiver of the violation in that
employee’s future severance agreement. In other words, the employer’s
incentive is to deny FMLA rights to the extent it can afford to
compensate the employee, and to the extent it believes the employee will
agree to the waiver. The employee stands a lesser chance that her
FMLA rights will be recognized where the employer thinks its interests
are better served through a waiver. Over time, the distressed employee’s
various absences from work for doctor and hospital visits may lead to
her firing. Regardless of whether or not she signs a waiver, her federal
rights were violated and perceptions of FMLA rights in the workplace
were lowered. 131 Other employees’ knowledge of the denial of leave
time will likely dissuade them from trying to assert their FMLA rights.
The result of an enforceable waiver is that employers have less
incentive to rein in their discriminatory practices as long as they commit
acts valued at or below the cost they are willing to pay in a severance
agreement. 132 In this way, any unscrupulous employer can violate the
FMLA to maintain or enhance its bottom line. Employees working at
large corporations which have funds available to purchase a waiver may
129. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000).
130. Richard J. Lussier, Title II of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act: A
License for Age Discrimination? The Problem Identified and Proposed Solutions, 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 189, 194 (1998).
131. Even if a waiver is signed and the employee is compensated, other employees
are unlikely to learn of this because the employee will no longer be working at the
business or office. It would be reasonable for remaining employees to believe that the
violations went unremedied.
132. See Judith A. McMorrow, Retirement Incentives in the Twenty First Century:
The Move Toward Employer Control of the ADEA, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 795 (1997), for a
discussion of the waiver problem in an ADEA context: “Employers could put together
incentives that otherwise would violate the ADEA, but offer attractive payments or
buyouts under the shadow of layoffs. Risk-adverse employees are likely to take the
offer. The employer’s underlying [unlawful] conduct is shielded from public review.”
Id. at 807.
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be particularly at risk of FMLA maltreatment. In effect, the very fact
that an employer is covered by the FMLA, meaning the business has
fifty or more employees, may suggest that the employer is large enough
to have sufficient funds to buy off an employee’s claims. 133 Such
disregard for FMLA protections, if sanctioned by enforceable waivers,
would not serve the goals of deterrence for which employment statutes
with antidiscriminatory provisions were passed. 134
There is also much to be said for the publicity and exposure entailed in
litigation that private waivers preclude. Compliance with the FMLA
may be eroded by a lack of litigation because employers are shielded
from “reputational effects” of their actions through private waivers. 135
Employers can “avoid[] potentially unfavorable publicity, thereby limiting
consumers’, and others’, ability to know whether they are patronizing a
lawbreaker.” 136 Disclosures in litigation of employer discriminatory
practices or workplace incidents are also themselves important, as they
may reveal “patterns of noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation
of the Act’s operation or entrenched resistance to its commands.” 137

133. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000).
134. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (stating
that Title VII, FLSA, ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act were enacted to eliminate the
“vestiges of discrimination” in employment practices, with objectives of deterrence and
compensation for injuries).
135. Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights,
Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 704 (2004)
(examining the negative consequences of including mandatory arbitration clauses in
individual employment contracts).
136. Id. The recent class action suit against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is an example of
the negative publicity that can accompany allegations of discrimination in the
employment context. The plaintiffs, initially thought to include more than 1.6 million
current and former female employees, allege that Wal-Mart frequently paid its female
workers less than their male counterparts, and often bypassed women for promotions.
Wal-Mart shares dropped ninety-seven cents, or 1.8%, in morning trading after the class
action approval was announced in 2004. Judge Certifies Wal-Mart Class Action Lawsuit,
MSNBC, June 22, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5269131/. Shares were little
changed when the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s class certification in February
of 2007. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), withdrawn, 509 F.3d
1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (superseding withdrawn February 2007 opinion and again affirming
lower court’s class certification). The class could now include as many as 1.5 million
women who have worked for Wal-Mart since 1998. Dukes, 509 F.3d at 1174. A likely
effect of exposure and publicity of litigation was Wal-Mart’s hiring of a “chief diversity
officer” and establishment of an advisory panel to develop “equal employment
opportunity.” Abigail Goldman, Wal-Mart Loses Job-Bias Appeal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2007, at C3.
137. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358–59.
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This awareness of industry-wide misconceptions about FMLA policies
or widespread refusal to follow its requirements may spur remedial
government action, alert employees to their FMLA rights with which
they are unfamiliar, and dissuade prospective employees from accepting
employment at an egregious FMLA violator. Bypassing litigation through
the enforcement of private waivers, however, harms the government’s
ability to measure the success of the FMLA as revealed in litigation
disclosures of noncompliance. 138 Finally, lack of litigation of FMLA
claims may harm enforcement of the Act by inhibiting the development
of precedent. 139 This is detrimental because employment law precedent
helps guide parties, illustrates how statutes are being interpreted, and
builds a body of law that systematically elaborates the statute. 140
D. Market-Based Approaches to the Law Are Ill-Equipped
to Further the Purposes of the FMLA
Enforcing contracts on grounds of market efficiency and freedom of
contract principles creates tension with outlying social relationships and
can lead to institutions suffering as a result of individual maximizing
behavior. 141 This occurs because contract enforcement based on
autonomy, voluntariness, and consent does not consider the needs of
each person of a group and lacks sensitivity to surrounding individuals
and communities. 142 Reliance upon market-based approaches, which
courts such as the one in Faris presumably used in support of enforcing
the waiver in that case, can actually leave employment institutions and
employees worse off and is contrary to why the FMLA was created.
1. Lack of Employee Bargaining Power
The primary method for asserting employee needs in the United States
has traditionally been through market-based approaches and freedom of
contract. 143 Although market-based approaches rely on the efficacy of
individual bargaining, employees have notoriously small bargaining

138. See id. at 359 (noting that the efficacy of an Act’s enforcement mechanisms, as
revealed in litigation disclosures of noncompliance, is important in measuring the
success of the Act); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974)
(“[T]he private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the
important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices.”).
139. See Summers, supra note 135.
140. Id.
141. Zalesne, supra note 56, at 595–96.
142. TREBILCOCK, supra note 56, at 18.
143. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen Brun, Protecting Families in a Global
Economy, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 188–89 (2006).
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power, leading them to acquire only “uneven benefits” and an “impoverished
solution” which may fail to meet their basic needs. 144 For example,
prior to the FMLA, a father-employee who missed work to care for a
gravely sick daughter could be fired by his employer and left
unemployed with no recourse or remedy under federal law. Private
negotiations and contract, which produced such unpalatable results for
employees, have been eroded by government involvement through
legislation such as the FMLA. 145 Given that a lack of bargaining power
makes it nearly impossible for employees themselves to secure
allowances for family and medical leave from employers, Congress
intervened through legislation to protect a majority of the U.S.
workforce. 146 Allowing employees to bargain with employers over
terms of a severance agreement waiver would present the same concerns
of unequal employee bargaining power that led to the enacting of the
FMLA.
2. Market Failure and Imperfect Information
Even if viewed from an economic perspective, embracing the antiwaiver approach may not violate market principles that value freedom of
contract. A market-based approach suggests that market forces will
ensure that contracts, including FMLA waivers, are socially efficient and
beneficial. 147 This is premised on the idea that a perfect market itself
corrects any “market failure,” or anything that prevents it from operating
perfectly. 148 For this reason, the freedom of contract should not be
restricted. 149 However, market failures do occur and lead institutions to
144. Id. at 188; see also Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728,
735 (1981) (noting that national labor and employment policies are “[p]redicated on the
assumption that individual workers have little, if any bargaining power”).
145. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers into the TwentyFirst Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 686–87
(1993).
146. Id. at 687. A similar lack of bargaining power and need for at least minimal
employee protection also led Congress to enact workers compensation, unemployment,
and wage and hour legislation. See Marc D. Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of
Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 73–74 (1985).
147. Korobkin, supra note 66, at 1203.
148. Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 81, 84 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
149. Id.; see also Korobkin, supra note 66, at 1207 (noting that, in reference to
buyers and sellers, “[w]ithout market failure, there is no valid consequentialist argument
for non-enforcement of any contract terms”).
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intervene. 150 In the FMLA context, a market failure plausibly occurred
by way of the lack of employee bargaining power with employers which
prevented employees from obtaining protection for their basic needs
through contract. 151 Congress’s intervention in 1993 through the FMLA
could be viewed as the corresponding institutional involvement. From
this perspective, a pre-FMLA market failure arguably occurred and
corrective legislative measures were justifiably taken. Therefore, courts
restricting the freedom of contract by holding waivers illegal are acting
in accordance with market principles because they are upholding the
corrective measure that remedied the market failure.
Imperfect information can also cause market failure.152 This imperfection
can take the form of a person misperceiving changes in the risks in a
contract. 153 In the situation of an employee presented with a severance
package and waiver, the employee is particularly likely to misperceive
the allocation of risk as to FMLA claims. Data from the DOL raise
concerns about the extent of employees’ knowledge of their rights under
the Act, and subsequently knowledge of claims they may be waiving. 154
The DOL survey in 2000 showed “a majority of employees in both
covered and noncovered establishments have heard of [the] FMLA, but
about half do not know whether the law applies to them.” 155 The fact
that such large numbers of employees are unsure if they are even
covered by the FMLA, let alone do not know the specifics of the
legislation, would seem to constitute imperfect information for purposes
of a market failure that necessitates government intervention. Employees
who are unfamiliar with the substance of the FMLA and its possible
application to them cannot know that they are signing away rights to
pursue FMLA claims they do not know exist. That discrimination
against working mothers in the workplace is often subtle and difficult to
detect may also lead women employees to not recognize a claim they

150. Craswell, supra note 148. “Market failure” is anything that prevents the market
from operating perfectly. Id. at 84.
151. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
139, 213–14 (2005) (discussing that a market failure may occur when parties with
disparate status-based characteristics, such as poverty or wealth, or lack of education or
business sophistication, attempt to transact).
152. Craswell, supra note 148, at 84.
153. Id. at 89.
154. See Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 20.
155. Id.; see, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 628 (2001) (stating that
employee testified he was unfamiliar with the FMLA because employer Maryland State
Police Department provided no notice to employees of FMLA provisions, and employer
told him there was “no way” he could take more than two weeks of leave to care for
newborn and his wife).
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may have. 156 In all, employees are likely to erroneously evaluate the
risks in the severance package, leading them to believe they are walking
away with a much more favorable bargain than actually exists. While a
court that enforces FMLA waivers would presumably require that they
are “knowing and voluntary,” 157 a presumption that they are binding
would lead to many signed and privately executed agreements that never
received a court’s scrutiny, resulting in the employees’ ignorance of
their rights going undetected. 158
Finally, if the market is functioning imperfectly and necessitates
government involvement, the market is improved only if a court or
legislature can “ban the inefficient terms without also banning the efficient
ones.” 159 In the FMLA context, the analysis might more appropriately

156. The subtle nature that employment discrimination against women may take is
due in part to mutually reinforcing stereotypes against women in the workplace. Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs that
“[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes
presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men.” 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
Presuming a lack of domesticity in men led employers, prior to the FMLA, to deny men
leave accommodations because the family was regarded as the “woman’s domain.”
These stereotypes led women to continue to assume the role of primary caregivers, and
“fostered employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their
value as employees.” Id. Such engrained perceptions of gender roles in the workplace
create an environment where subtle discrimination may be difficult to detect. Id. See
infra notes 209, 210, and accompanying text for more of the Supreme Court’s discussion
of gender discrimination in Hibbs.
157. Federal employment statutes in which waivers are enforceable generally
require that they be “knowing and voluntary.” See Senn, supra note 68, at 309
(recognizing that nine of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals use a totality of the
circumstances test to assess knowledge and voluntariness, while the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits continue to use a contract-based approach); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)
(2000) (requiring knowing and voluntary waivers for ADEA).
158. Despite the troubling statistics showing a fairly uninformed workforce, the
2000 data also show an increased use of leave for reasons other than one’s own health.
Waiver proponents could argue that this increase reflects a growing awareness of the
types of leave afforded under the FMLA, and subsequently greater knowledge of the
Act’s protections. See Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 20.
159. Craswell, supra note 148, at 89. The question is unsettled as to what notice of
FMLA provisions an employer must provide. The statute provides that an employer
must post a notice “in conspicuous places” setting forth employees’ FMLA rights. 29
U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2000). However, the DOL expanded upon this requirement and issued
regulations requiring “more comprehensive and individualized notice” for those
employees who request leave. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S.
81, 87–88 (2002) (“According to the Secretary . . . the regulations [are] necessary to
ensure that employees are aware of their rights when they take leave.”). The Supreme
Court passed on the question of whether the regulations accord with the statute and are
valid. Id. at 88. The DOL noted the Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. decision
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look to ensuring that Congress’s introduction of efficient terms is not
counteracted. In other words, if misinformation or lack of bargaining
power creates a form of market failure justifying some degree of
institutional aid in specifying employment terms, this intervention is
counteracted by employee waivers of those terms. While Congress may
have introduced large-scale family and leave protections, including
terms of leave, 160 reinstatement, 161 and anti-retaliatory provisions, 162 so
long as courts are free to enforce waivers of claims to these rights, the
inefficiency sought to be expunged returns. Allowing waivers would not
forestall the market from operating with misperceptions, misinformation,
and unequal bargaining power; thus the waivers would constitute
inefficient terms that should be banned. If the term is not barred, then
employees are left with the same unprotected status that they had prior to
the FMLA protections.
E. Concerns of Employer Coercion: Economic
Duress and Undue Influence
The frequent financial vulnerability and worries of FMLA leavetakers raise concerns that coercive economic undertones may be present
when employees waive their rights. The most frequent concern of FMLA
leave-takers in the 2000 DOL survey was financial. 163 More than fiftythree percent of them “worried about not having enough money to pay
the bills” and some cut their leave short due to money issues. 164 Of
those who did not take leave, seventy-seven percent said it was because
they could not afford it. 165 Additionally, more than two-thirds of leavetakers aged eighteen to twenty-four who had household incomes below
$20,000 did not receive pay during their leave, and less than one-fourth
of older leave takers, aged fifty to sixty-four, with household incomes of
$50,000 or more received no pay. 166 In all, over fifty-eight percent of

and solicited public comment on the notice issue in its recent request for public comment
regarding FMLA effectiveness. Request for Information on the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg, 69,504, 69,508 (Dec. 1, 2006). See supra note 17 for
further discussion of the DOL request. For more on FMLA notice requirements, see
Debra L. Greenberger, Note, Toward Increased Notice of FMLA and ADA Protections,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1797 (2005) (arguing that the FMLA notice regime needs to be “reconceptualiz[ed]” to focus on reaching target populations, and to compensate for
employees’ hesitancy to assert their statutory rights).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000).
161. Id. § 2614(a)(1).
162. Id. §§ 2614(a)(2), 2615(a).
163. Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 21.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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leave-takers not receiving pay characterized it as “somewhat or very
difficult to make ends meet.” 167 In light of the financial hardship facing
many covered employees, it would be unsurprising if employers
recognized the vulnerability of the workers and used it to their advantage
to persuade employees to sign severance package waivers of rights to
pursue damages for FMLA violations. 168
Courts will police severance agreements and contracts for hints of
undue influence or economic duress as a “‘last resort’ to correct
exploitation of business exigencies.” 169 Economic duress renders a
contract voidable, while undue influence will render it invalid and
unenforceable. 170 Whether the pressures on an employee to sign a
167. Id.
168. The employer may also be able to take advantage of related employee
concerns. As Eileen Silverstein discusses, even if an employee with a possible
employment discrimination claim is “quite angry and ‘knows in her bones’ that her
employer acted illegally . . . she recognizes the need to secure another job and the
unattractiveness of an applicant who is suing a former employer.” See Silverstein, supra
note 61, at 492. The illegalization of FMLA waivers in the anti-waiver approach would
not dispel this employee’s concerns as to the effect of pending litigation against her
former employer. However, the anti-waiver approach would help preclude the
discrimination from occurring in the first place. If the employer knows it cannot buy a
release, the employer then has incentives to comply with the FMLA and avoid the
expense, publicity, and uncertainty of litigation. See text at notes 132 through 136 for
discussion of deterrence and publicity. The anti-waiver approach precludes the employer
from capitalizing on employee fears of having to obtain new employment by ensuring
court or DOL action to hold the employer accountable for its noncompliance with the
FMLA.
169. Johnson v. IBM Corp., 891 F. Supp. 522, 529 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Rich
& Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1994)) (upholding
release of claims as it was not obtained through economic duress or undue influence);
see also Aubert v. Entergy Corp., 762 So.2d 288, 291–92 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (reviewing
and upholding OWBPA releases against economic duress challenge where employees
discovered possible age-motivation in their low performance rankings which led them to
agree to the releases). In Faris, for example, the employee alleged duress, stating that
she was pressured into signing the agreement because she was confronted by her
supervisor and told, “This is your last opportunity to sign the release if you expect to get
compensation for it.” Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 2003).
The court found that she did not tender back the consideration to ratify the release. Id. at
322–23.
170. For undue influence to void an agreement, courts must generally find that
persuasion is exercised on a party who is under the domination of the person executing
it, and that person is justified in assuming the other will not act in a manner inconsistent
with their welfare. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981). A release may
be rendered voidable due to economic duress where a party is subjected to a wrongful act
such as an improper threat, and must succumb to the party or face “financial ruin.”
Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001). The wrongful act must be
sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonable person faced with no reasonable alternative to
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presumably enforceable waiver rise to a level to make the waiver voidable
is not examined unless the employee later decides to challenge the
agreement in court. Thus, employers may take advantage of employees’
unequal bargaining power and financial instability to induce the employees
to waive FMLA rights on the hope that the employee will not undertake
to challenge the agreement. 171 Making FMLA waivers illegal removes
this incentive of the employer to exploit employees.
F. Courts Should Not Treat the FMLA Analogously
to ADEA and Title VII
1. The FMLA Distinguished
Courts that have held waivers enforceable have often done so on
grounds that the FMLA is similar to ADEA and Title VII in that all three
are employment antidiscrimination statutes with similar protections, and
waivers are enforceable under ADEA and Title VII. 172 However, this
argument overlooks an overriding distinction that separates the FMLA
from the other statutes: the FMLA is directed toward protecting families,
not merely individuals as employees. 173
Unlike ADEA and Title VII which were enacted to protect individual
employees from discrimination, 174 the FMLA addresses itself to the
larger sphere of the family. 175 For their part, Title VII protects
“individuals” from employment practices that discriminate on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 176 and ADEA protects an

succumb to the pressure. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176
(1981) (defining economic duress as an improper threat made, which includes a threat
where resulting agreement is on unfair terms and either what is threatened is otherwise a
use of power for illegitimate ends, or the threat’s effectiveness in inducing assent is
significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat). Economic
duress will not be found simply because an employee entered into an agreement with
which they were not fully satisfied. Bhushan v. Loma Alta Towers Owner’s Ass’n., 148
Fed. App’x 882, 886 (11th Cir. 2005).
171. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
172. See, for example, discussion of Title VII and ADEA and the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit in Faris, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
173. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000) (stating purposes of FMLA include “to
balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability
and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family
integrity”).
174. The purposes of ADEA include to “promote employment for older persons
based on their ability rather than age” and to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination and
help employment. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000). The purpose of Title VII is to make
unlawful employment discrimination against an individual on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
175. See supra notes 4, 126, and accompanying text.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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“individual” from discrimination in employment on the basis of age. 177
To be sure, these two Acts are strikingly similar. The Supreme Court
has noted that prohibitions in ADEA were derived verbatim from Title
VII. 178 On the other hand, Congress explicitly stated that the purpose of
the FMLA was to strike a balance between the demands of the
workplace and the needs of families, to promote the stability and
economic security of families, and to preserve family integrity. 179
Analyzing these three statutes as if they are one and the same ignores the
fact that Congress intended the FMLA to protect the interests of more
than just the employee who is given an option by her employer to release
statutory violations; the Act envisions broader protections. 180 The
broader protection is evidenced in that even “stray but hostile remarks”
are actionable under the FMLA because they may inhibit employees
from taking leave or “utiliz[ing] other family-friendly benefits.” 181 Title
VII, on the other hand, focuses on “overt subjective intent” and more
than offhand remarks are required to constitute discrimination. 182
It is true that in some situations families would benefit from a family
member receiving money in lieu of the right to pursue FMLA claims,
such as when the family is facing pressing economic difficulties. But
this does not support waivers generally. For one, the economic pressure
the family member-employee feels increases the likelihood that the
employee can be taken advantage of by the employer who offers
undercompensation for the waiver. Families will be harmed if the
family member accepts a small payout where a much larger award was

177. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
178. Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 & n.12 (1978) (comparing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) and noting that Title VII and ADEA
provisions each make it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
an individual,” or to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000).
180. Martin H. Malin, Interference with the Right to Leave Under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 329, 365–69 (2003) (discussing in what
ways the FMLA provides broader protection than Title VII and “its progeny”). Not only
does it envision broader protections, but Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs that the FMLA was enacted after Title VII
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act both failed to rectify the gender discrimination
problem in parental leave. 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003). It is therefore unlikely that
Congress intended FMLA provisions to mirror Title VII, as Title VII itself was an
unsuccessful legislative attempt to eradicate the discrimination.
181. Malin, supra note 180, at 367.
182. Id.
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available if the claim was recognized or pursued. In other words, a
waiver for a small amount of cash may eliminate a claim worth many
times more money, to the family’s detriment. Given the problems of
unequal bargaining power and coercion of employees, protecting the
interests of families supports forbidding family members from waiving
their rights, especially when they are most vulnerable. 183
Because ADEA and Title VII were enacted with more of a focus on
the individual than was the FMLA, it is reasonable that the individual is
permitted to waive claims and rights under those two acts. The statutes
contemplate protecting society through protection of the individual, not
protecting society family by family. 184 Conversely, the FMLA seeks to
secure and protect the needs of children, spouses, and parents in the
family unit. 185 Because Congress sought to protect multiple persons’
interests in one context, it is doubtful it intended for an individual to
singlehandedly waive violations that affected the interests of multiple
family members. For example, the 2000 DOL survey showed that a
large majority of leave-takers said that taking leave had a positive
impact on their ability to care for family members (78.7%), their own
family’s emotional well-being (70.1%), and their own family member’s
physical health (63.0%). 186 Enforcing a waiver of claims which may
have arisen after detrimentally impacting an entire family unit is at odds
with the FMLA, an Act through which Congress intended to protect
more than just the employee. 187
Other distinctions between employment discrimination statutes counsel
against analyzing the statutes as one and the same. For one, Title VII
and the ADA pertain to individuals in their capacity as employees. 188
The FMLA, as previously noted, extends beyond the workplace and is
intended to preserve the family and work-life balance. 189 Title VII also
applies to employers with fifteen or more employees, while the FMLA
183. The Fourth Circuit in Taylor noted the vulnerability of FMLA employees in
stating that the FMLA leave standard is necessary so that the “‘minority of employers
who act irresponsibly [unscrupulous employers]’” cannot “more easily exploit
employees at the times when they are most vulnerable.” Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc.,
415 F.3d 364, 374 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 5 (1993), reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert.
filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539).
184. Nowhere in ADEA or Title VII do the statutes include provisions regarding
family or family members. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000).
186. Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 20.
187. Unlawfully denying a leave request likely harms the person for whom the
employee sought to care. For example, a severely ill parent loses the companionship,
comfort, and physical care that an adult child can render by way of taking leave.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000).
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000).
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minimum is fifty employees. 190 Because smaller employers tend to be
on fairly even bargaining terms with employees, 191 it is more reasonable
that Title VII allows for waivers. The fact that FMLA-covered employers
may be larger alludes to their ability to entertain litigation in the court
system, whereas the burden of the expense of litigation on a Title VII or
ADA employer weighs in favor of allowing waivers. 192 The FMLA also
applies to all state and local government employers regardless of the
employer’s size. 193 The size of the government employer may not
matter as much as that of a private employer because in all governmentemployer disputes the cost of defending from liability lies with the
government. Finally, waivers are enforceable under Title VII because
Congress’s preferred method—or method that is “at least as viable as
any other”—to vindicate those rights is through “voluntary conciliation
and compliance.” 194
2. The FMLA May Be Better Characterized as a Labor, Rather
than an Antidiscrimination, Statute, Which Weighs
Against the Enforceability of Waivers
Despite some judicial analysis of the FMLA as comparable to the
ADA, Title VII, or ADEA, 195 the statute may best be described as one
regulating labor practices like the FLSA, rather than discriminatory

190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (2007).
191. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 465–66 (2000)
(discussing also that smaller start-up businesses not covered by the FMLA are often
more vulnerable to employment discrimination lawsuits because they do not have the
“proper mechanisms to ensure that hiring and firing isn’t discriminatory” (quoting
Tatiana Boncompagni, High-Tech: Full Employment Act—Labor Practices Boom with
Economy, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at 1)).
192. See, e.g., Melissa S. Wandersee, The Far-Reaching Effects of Reproduction as
a “Major Life Activity” Under the ADA: What Will This Expansion Mean to Employers
and Their Insured?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 429, 433 (1999) (noting that for
ADA, small business owners will likely agree to “the most extreme requests for
accommodation [so to comply with the “reasonable accommodations” requirement of the
statute] because they cannot afford to risk litigation”). It is likely that smaller employers
such as these are more able to afford to buy a release of liability from an employee rather
than endure costly litigation expenses.
193. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.104(a), 825.108.
194. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 862 (5th Cir.
1975).
195. See, e.g., Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2003)
(comparing the FMLA to ADEA and Title VII).
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ones.196 While waivers are generally enforceable under the antidiscrimination
statutes, 197 they are not enforceable under labor statutes such as the
FLSA. 198
It bears repeating that the Department of Labor explicitly analogized
the FMLA to the FLSA when issuing the regulations that would govern
the FMLA. 199 In considering the FMLA, the House of Representatives
also analogized it to minimum standards of child labor laws, the
minimum wage, and health and safety standards, 200 while the Senate said
the “minimum labor standard” was necessary for healthy competition. 201
Congressional debate also reveals that the Act was envisioned to be a
labor-oriented statute rather than one aimed as much at combating
discrimination, as were Title VII and ADEA. 202 Furthermore, the
196. See Michael L. Ripple, Comment, Supervisors Beware: The Family and
Medical Leave Act May be Hazardous to Your Health, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH. L. &
POL’Y 273, 276 (1999).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000) (allowing knowing and voluntary waivers under
ADEA); Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 1986) (enforcing Title
VII waiver); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (including no prohibition on waivers in
Title VII text).
198. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–08 (1945). The Court noted
that the FLSA was enacted to
protect certain groups of the population from sub-standard wages and
excessive work hours which endangered the national health and well-being and
the free flow of goods in interstate commerce. The statute was a recognition of
the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and
employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory
legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national
health and efficiency . . . . No one can doubt but that to allow waiver of
statutory wages [or employee’s right to liquidated damages] by agreement
would nullify the purposes of the Act.
Id. at 706–07; see also Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740
(1981) (noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the FLSA frequently
emphasize the nonwaivable nature of employee’s right to minimum wage and overtime
pay under the FLSA, and stating that “FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or
otherwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of the statute and thwart the
legislative policies it was designed to effectuate” (quoting Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.
O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945))); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114–16
(1946) (stating that “the remedy of liquidated damages cannot be bargained away by
bona fide settlements of disputes of coverage” because allowing waivers of liquidated
damages would thwart public policy of promptly paid, mandatory minimum wages that
Congress adopted in the FLSA).
199. See supra text accompanying note 118.
200. H.R. REP. NO. 103-8(II), at 37 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6–7.
201. S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 5, 18 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7, 20
(“Federal labor standards take broad societal concerns out of the competitive process so
that conscientious employers are not forced to compete with unscrupulous employers. . . .
Uniform standards like the FMLA help all businesses maintain a minimum floor of
protection for their employees without jeopardizing or decreasing their competitiveness.”).
202. Senator Dodd referred to the legislation as a “minimum labor standard,
recognizing the demographic changes that have occurred in this country and the absolute
necessity not to place working families in the position where they must choose between
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penalties imposed by the FMLA also resemble labor statutes in that they
are more expansive than traditional employment antidiscrimination
statute penalties. 203 The FMLA allows for equitable and punitive relief
against “any employer,” which has been interpreted to apply to both
employers and individuals themselves, such as supervisors.204 Individual
liability under antidiscrimination statutes, on the other hand, has been
rejected by courts. 205 Finally, that Congress chose to protect smaller
businesses from obligations to provide FMLA protections when it
created a fifty-employee minimum shows that Congress was conscious
of the economic consequences of the Act and not squarely focused on
protection from discrimination as in other statutes. 206 Because the FLSA
does not permit generic employee waivers, viewing the FMLA as a
similar labor statute supports illegalizing employee severance agreement
FMLA waivers, or at least supports requiring some fairness scrutiny of
the agreement. 207 Even viewing the FMLA in part as a labor statute
distinguishes it from the civil rights statutes which are focused primarily
on eradicating discrimination.
G. Women in the Workplace
Forbidding FMLA waivers may also be important to achieve the
FMLA objectives as related to women in the workplace. Congressional
FMLA findings indicated that the nature of the roles of men and women
in society often leads the primary responsibility of family caretaking to
fall on women, thus affecting the lives of working women more than
the family that they want to take care of during a time of crisis and the job they need.”
These comments on the Senate floor allude to the likelihood that the legislation was
more a labor statute taking into account changes in U.S. society than a full-fledged
antidiscrimination statute. 139 CONG. REC. S1254, S1257 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Dodd).
203. Ripple, supra note 196, at 299.
204. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (2000); Ripple, supra note 196, at 299.
205. Ripple, supra note 196, at 299; see, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations,
Ltd., 55 F.3d, 1276, 1279–81 (7th Cir. 1995) (deciding that ADA definition of employer,
which mirrors the definition in Title VII and ADEA, does not extend to individual
liability).
206. See Ripple, supra note 196, at 300–01. This Congressional intent to minimize
the economic consequences of the FMLA has proven successful, as both the 1995 and
2000 DOL surveys revealed that about ninety percent of employers found no noticeable
effect on their business as a result of complying with the FMLA. Waldfogel, supra note
4, at 19.
207. See infra note 225, discussing how FLSA waivers are enforceable only after
judicial approval or the Secretary of Labor approves the agreement.
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those of men. 208 In upholding the FMLA and its abrogation of state
immunity in 2003, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the record of
states’ unconstitutional participation in and fostering of gender-based
discrimination in administering leave benefits justified the prophylactic
legislation. 209 He noted Congress’s finding that “[h]istorically, denial or
curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has been traceable
directly to the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and
workers second,” which in turn has “justified discrimination against
women when they are mothers or mothers-to-be.” 210 The pervasive
history of gender discrimination against mothers in the workplace raises
concerns that women may be particularly susceptible to coercion in
agreeing to sign FMLA waivers, or may be targeted by employers to
sign such agreements. To allow waivers might insulate employers from
liability for such discrimination and, contrary to the FMLA, actually
promote it. 211
V. INVALIDATING AND ILLEGALIZING FMLA WAIVERS
Although there are arguments for enforcing FMLA waivers, resting
primarily on freedom of contract principles that purport to promote an
efficient market,212 stronger countervailing arguments require prohibiting
them. 213 The FMLA was not enacted as a commercial endeavor to
208. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000).
209. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003).
210. Id. at 736 (quoting The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: J. Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor
Standards of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 100 (1986)). This
gender discrimination against women in the workplace can coincide with gender
discrimination against men taking leave. Martin H. Malin explored this workplace
hostility toward men and found that “[m]en’s accommodation requests are often met by,
‘Your wife should handle it.’” Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1047, 1077 (1994). Fathers may also be met with taunts and comments from
coworkers that a “‘real man’ does not take parental leave.” Joan Williams, Our Economy of
Mothers and Others: Women and Economics Revisited, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 411,
426 (2002). Malin argues that the FMLA provision forbidding employers from
interfering with FMLA rights should be applied to combat this discrimination. See 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2000) (noninterference provision); Malin, supra, at 1090–94. He
suggests using the hostile work environment paradigm from Title VII sexual harassment
cases to hold employers liable for workplace environments that discourage men’s leavetaking. This “FMLA hostile work environment” liability would be broader than Title
VII because the FMLA does not limit illegal discrimination to terms or conditions of
employment as does Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (2000).
211. See also supra note 33 discussing the hole in FMLA coverage of independent
contractors and how it disproportionately impacts women.
212. See Epstein, supra note 55, at 951.
213. Notably, when contract principles are used they are often adhered to even at
the expense of the public interest. Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of
Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 918–19 (1974) (describing the evolution
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maximize the efficiency of markets, but rather to promote family wellbeing in a time of changing workforce. 214 Given that the Act was
created with the nation’s families at the forefront, it is unlikely that
Congress intended to allow employees to privately relinquish their rights
to pursue claims in exchange for money. Such a practice shields employers
from the public exposure of litigation and amounts to buying a “license
to discriminate,” which effectively undermines the purposes of the
FMLA. 215 In fact, the DOL referred to an FMLA prohibition on waivers
as “sound public policy,” 216 the soundness of which is bolstered by the
historically disparate bargaining power between employers and employees.217
Furthermore, with employee coercion concerns, 218 the distinguishing
features of the FMLA as related to other employment discrimination
statutes, 219 and noted workplace discrimination against women, 220 it is
difficult to accept that Congress intended for binding severance agreement
waivers under the Act. Finally, interpreting section 825.220(d) to prohibit
waivers of both current and prospective rights is entirely consistent with
the plain meaning of the regulation. 221
Rendering FMLA waivers illegal, however, is perhaps not the only
acceptable solution. As some courts have analogized the FMLA to the
FLSA, 222 an approach similar to FLSA enforcement of settlement
agreements is an option. An employer who violates the FLSA is liable
to its employees for unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation,
and for an equal amount in liquidated damages, 223 but employees may

of eighteenth-century equitable contract principles into nineteenth-century contract atwill principles that seek to protect the market economy and commercial interests at the
expense of the public interest).
214. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000).
215. See Lussier, supra note 130 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. In its amicus brief successfully
arguing for rehearing in Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., the Secretary took the position
that section 825.220(d) does not bar the “retrospective settlement of FMLA claims.” See
DOL Supplemental Brief, supra note 118, at 4. In its amicus brief for the rehearing, the
DOL also claimed that it has never established a system for reviewing “private
settlement” of FMLA claims, although it admitted that it has “supervised” settlements
investigated by the Wage and Hour Division. See DOL Brief, supra note 118.
217. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 156, 209, and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 119 and accompanying text, and text at note 118.
223. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
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not waive FLSA rights in a private employee-employer agreement. 224
Employees may settle or compromise their rights in only two ways: they
can accept the Secretary of Labor’s supervision of payments of unpaid
wages owed to them, whereby the employees waive their right to pursue
claims; or employees may bring suit directly against their employer and
a district court can enter a stipulated judgment after analyzing a
proposed settlement. 225 Allowing the court to scrutinize the agreement
increases the likelihood that it “reflect[s] a [more] reasonable compromise
of disputed issues than a mere waiver of statutory rights brought by an
employer’s overreaching.” 226 If the agreement is reasonable, district
courts may approve it in order to promote the policy of encouraging
settlement in litigation. 227
Utilizing the FLSA scheme for DOL and judicial supervision of
FMLA employer-employee agreements is likely feasible. The FMLA
directs the Secretary to attempt to resolve complaints of FMLA
violations “in the same manner” that the Secretary attempts to resolve
FLSA settlements. 228 The Department, therefore, has the same authority
to supervise binding settlements and waivers under the FMLA that it has
224. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 371, 374 (4th Cir. 2005), aff’d
on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S.
Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539); see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
225. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (including procedure for Secretary to supervise payments);
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 1982)
(noting that if an employee does not involve the Secretary of Labor, then the “only other
route” to compromise FLSA claims is through stipulated judgment in a suit against an
employer under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), in which the court analyzes the proposed agreement
for fairness). Employees may not settle for an amount less than what they are owed
under the statute. A settlement may also only be binding where there is a bona fide
dispute over the amount owed or liquidated damages. See, e.g., Guess v. Montague, 140
F.2d 500, 504–06 (4th Cir. 1943) (stating that an agreement for less than the minimum
wage is nonbinding because it contravenes express provisions of the statute, but “there is
nothing in the statute or in public policy which forbids settlement of the claim for
liquidated damages at any figure that the parties may agree on”).
226. Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1354. Another benefit of a settlement in this
context, as opposed to a general FMLA waiver, is that the employer may agree as part of
the negotiated settlement to take “ameliorative steps” related to the underlying FMLA
complaint that will benefit the remaining workforce. See Silverstein, supra note 61, at
486–87 (discussing advantages of negotiated settlements taking place after a complaint
or administrative charge is filed, as opposed to mere waivers of statutory violations
before any legal action is instituted).
227. Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1354 (refusing to approve agreement where
employees did not consult lawyers, some could not speak English, employer insinuated
employees were entitled to no back-pay, and employer noted that past employees
returned settlement payments from DOL actions because they felt they had already been
paid what they were due).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b) (2000) (“The Secretary shall receive, investigate, and
attempt to resolve complaints of violations of section 2615 of this title in the same
manner that the Secretary receives, investigates, and attempts to resolve complaints of
violations of sections 206 and 207 [FLSA provisions] of this title.”).
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under the FLSA, 229 and has exercised these supervisory powers to settle
FMLA claims. 230
The added responsibilities on the Department of an explicit requirement
to supervise FMLA claims are also probably manageable, and only a
slight burden if any at all. First, DOL enforcement data show that
employers are at far more risk of violating the FLSA than the FMLA. 231
Second, a majority of employers are complying with the FMLA, which
lowers their risk of liability and the likelihood that they will insert
FMLA waiver clauses into severance agreements which might require
DOL approval. 232 Severance agreements with FMLA provisions would
presumably only be necessary from the employer’s perspective in rare
situations where significant liability existed.233 Finally, no empirical evidence
has been presented by organizations opposing such an idea to show that
FLSA-like supervisory requirements would overwhelm DOL resources.234
In fact, it can take relatively minimal effort to meet DOL supervisory
requirements; one court found the requisite supervision where the DOL
investigated a claim, concluded FMLA back wages were owed,
forwarded release forms to the employer signed by the employee, and

229. See, e.g., Mion v. Aftermarket Tool & Equip. Group, 990 F. Supp. 535, 540
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (recognizing that, in accordance with § 2617(b), the Secretary has the
same authority to supervise binding FLSA settlements as it does for FMLA settlements).
230. See, e.g., id. (holding that the DOL supervised a settlement of employee’s
$310.18 FMLA back wage claims, within meaning of FLSA, where DOL provided
employer with release form, employer forwarded the form to employee along with the
check, and employee cashed the check and was aware of attached forms).
231. In 2003, there were 32,591 concluded FLSA back wages cases. In the same
year, there were only 3565 total FMLA complaints for back wages. U.S. Department of
Labor, 2003 Statistics Fact Sheet, Wage and Hour Fiscal Year 2003 Enforcement
Continues Record Climb, available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/statistics/200318.htm.
232. Supplemental Reply Brief of Appellant at 6, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc.,
493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-1525). In other words, it is not in employers’
interests to pay departing employees for FMLA waivers when the risk of liability for
FMLA violations is low.
233. Id. at 7.
234. See Supplemental Reply Brief on Panel Rehearing of Amici Curiae the Equal
Employment Advisory Council et al. at 8–9, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d
454 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-1525) [hereinafter EEAC Reply Brief] (suggesting that a
DOL approval requirement is unfeasible because DOL has no established system for
supervising private FMLA settlements); cf. Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae the
National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) and the North Carolina Academy of
Trial Lawyers (NCATL) at 7, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir.
2007) (No. 04-1525) (responding that if there was any empirical evidence of such
consequences of FLSA-like enforcement, organizations would have presented them).
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several other communications between the DOL and employer took
place. 235
Despite the practicality of such a scheme, several organizations claim
that an FMLA supervision requirement would undermine the preclusive
effect of general releases, thus lowering the amount employers are
willing to pay employees for releases 236 and decreasing the offering of
severance agreements. 237 This argument rests on the fact that “the
principal value of a general release is that it eliminates any possibility of
post-termination litigation” and “facilitat[es] a full and peaceful closure
of the employment relationship.” 238 But a release of all but FMLA
claims has value to an employer as it precludes the possibility of other
litigation, and has overarching value to the public by way of holding
employers accountable for FMLA noncompliance. The fact that the
amount paid for the release, not including FMLA claims, is lower than
that of an all-encompassing release also does not necessarily harm
employees; employees are worse off if they sign a release for claims that
would yield a larger payment if pursued. Furthermore, the approval
requirement does not prevent employers from drafting a separate FMLA
agreement for approval that accompanies the general release of all other
claims. Finally, facilitating a “full and peaceful” end to the employment
relationship should not come at the expense of a fair resolution of FMLA
violations, as adjudged by DOL or court supervision. In all, the possible
negative consequences of implementing a DOL or court supervision
requirement are likely overcome by the public policies in favor of the
approach. Protecting vulnerable employees from overreaching employers,
protecting the interests of families in times of need, and strengthening
the deterrent effect of the FMLA almost certainly compensate for any
imperfections in the process.

235. Mion, 990 F. Supp. at 540 (noting that the “other communications” included a
letter, fax, phone call, and one other communication); see also Cuevas v. Monroe St.
City Club, 752 F. Supp. 1405, 1416 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding under FLSA that there was
adequate supervision where DOL met with employer, received employer correspondence, and
DOL supplied release forms); Torreblanca v. Naas Foods, Inc., No. F 78-163, 1980 WL
2100, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (holding there was adequate supervision under FLSA
where employer treasurer and Secretary of Labor compliance officer exchanged a visit,
memorandum, phone call, and letter).
236. The lowered amount is a supposed result of possible FMLA liability still
existing.
237. EEAC Reply Brief, supra note 234. The organizations also claim that the
offering of severance agreements would surely decrease with such a rule because
employers would fear the possibility of added expense of defending suits if they could
not know that they would not be subjected to post-termination litigation. They also
suggest that in mass layoffs, employees are likely to be worse off because they would not
receive any financial relief.
238. Id.
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A third approach, perhaps a middle approach between making waivers
illegal and implementing an FLSA-like scheme, is to require that FMLA
waivers meet explicit requirements. 239 This could resemble the OWBPA
requirements that Congress enacted to protect older workers from
waiving their rights under ADEA.240 Like the FLSA supervision framework,
requiring a heightened standard for waivers would work to ensure the
agreement is fundamentally fair to the employee, and would abate
concerns of coercion and weak bargaining power accompanying general

239. An approach not endorsed by this Comment is mandatory arbitration of FMLA
claims. Employment arbitration has drawbacks similar to those of FMLA waivers. As
Richard A. Bales notes in his discussion of mandatory arbitration clauses pertaining to
all employee disputes, arbitration notably fails to deter discrimination. First, arbitration
reduces the cost of defending a suit, which makes employers less wary of violating the
Act. Second, it leads to confidential outcomes which have a host of negative
consequences related to compliance and deterrence of discrimination, as discussed supra
at notes 135 through 140. Arbitration also undermines employees’ right to a jury that
they would otherwise have in a civil suit. Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of
Employment Arbitration at Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 359–66 (2006).
The advantages of arbitration include speed, lower cost than litigation, and for those who
cannot afford representation by an attorney, access to dispute resolution. Id. at 353–57.
However, the DOL or court approval scheme, or explicit statutory requirements
suggested by this Comment, also offer these advantages without the serious concerns
associated with arbitration. For example, the DOL scheme may delay the enforcement
of a waiver, but it allows the DOL to track compliance and is not costly (at least
monetarily) to the employee.
240. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000). An individual may not waive an OWBPA right or
claim unless: (1) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the
employer that is “written in a manner calculated to be understood by the individual, or by
the average individual eligible to participate”; (2) the waiver specifically refers to rights
or claims arising under ADEA; (3) the individual does not waive rights or claims that
may arise after the date the waiver is executed; (4) the individual waives rights or claims
only in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the
individual already is entitled; (5) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an
attorney prior to executing the agreement; (6) (a) the individual is given at least twentyone days to consider the agreement, or (b) the individual is given at least forty-five days
to consider it if the waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other
employment termination program offered to a group of employees; (7) the agreement is
revocable for at least seven days following its execution, and is not effective or
enforceable until the revocation period expires; (8) if the waiver is in connection with an
exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group of
employees, the employer informs the individual in writing in a manner calculated to be
understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to (a) any class or group
of individuals covered by the program and any eligibility factors or time limits
applicable to the program, and (b) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or
selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or
unit who are not eligible or selected for the program.
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FMLA waivers. 241 Requiring that the agreement specifically refer to
FMLA rights would also minimize concerns that employees are waiving
rights which they did not realize existed. 242 However, implementing
requirements similar to those of OWBPA does not serve the public
policy goals of increasing FMLA compliance and promoting the
interests of families as much as a complete ban on waivers, or a DOL or
court approval requirement. 243 The scheme allows for situations where
employees never learn that a departing employee received compensation
for FMLA violations. This limited knowledge may dissuade remaining
employees from asserting their own rights to medical and family leave.
Also, it is probably unlikely that most employees encouraged to seek
legal advice before signing a waiver will do so, considering that
employees who took leave likely face financial difficulties. 244
It is important to note that making waivers illegal, FLSA-like
supervision, or explicit waiver requirements do not preclude a settlement
of claims after a complaint is filed or litigation is commenced. The
differences between a waiver and these options are significant. When an
employee signs a waiver abdicating the right to pursue any claims she
may have against her employer, it is unlikely she has retained an
attorney to advise her on the consequences or fairness of the agreement.
On the other hand, in a litigation settlement context an employee will
most likely be represented by an attorney who can guide the negotiations

241. Such requirements for FMLA waivers are similar to procedural requirements
suggested for use in other types of agreements, as well. See, e.g., Karen Servidea, Note,
Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the State’s Interest in Marriage, 91 VA. L.
REV. 535, 576 (2005). The author argues that concerns of bounded rationality in
enforcement of postnuptial agreements could be lessened by procedural requirements of
waiting periods, marital counseling, and independent legal advice. This would ensure
that the parties rationally analyze the risks of the contract, while not unnecessarily
infringing on the parties’ freedom to contract.
242. See supra note 155 and accompanying text, discussing the DOL survey that
showed a majority of employees have heard of the FMLA, but about half do not know
whether the law applies to them.
243. It is interesting to note that Congress decided to apply the heightened waiver
requirements only to older workers under ADEA, and not to female or minority workers
protected under Title VII. Congress contended that older workers “may be manipulated
or even coerced into signing away their ADEA protections,” and in contexts of
“voluntary” exit incentives they “have little or no reason to suspect that their employer is
a potential adversary.” H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 24 (1990). However, the manipulation and
coercion concerns are also present in the FMLA context, as is the presence of employees
ignorant of their FMLA rights who do not realize that an employer is potentially liable to
them. See supra note 155 and accompanying text, discussing the survey showing that
half of employees do not know whether the FMLA applies to them. For more on the
OWBPA requirements and the view that they are Congress’s response to the
shortcomings of the totality of the circumstances waiver test, see Senn, supra note 68.
244. See supra note 163 and accompanying text, discussing the financial hardship
that often afflicts leave-takers.
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and ensure that the decision is fully informed and in the best interest of
the employee. Both the anti-waiver approach and supervision requirements
ensure that an employer’s greater bargaining power does not overwhelm
the employee, and waiver requirements may lessen the effects of disparate
bargaining power. Also, where a severance agreement waiver is likely
signed on the employer’s “turf,” the employee agreeing to a settlement
has the advantage of distance from her workplace, which may foster
more rational and less emotional analysis. Finally, settlement agreements
sometimes include provisions whereby the employer promises to takes
steps to ameliorate the alleged violations of employee rights, which
could enhance compliance with FMLA provisions. 245
VI. CONCLUSION
A compelling need exists to uphold the integrity of the FMLA and
protect the rights of employees when they are weakest and most
vulnerable to employer overreaching, such as when facing trying family
events stemming from medical crises. Uninformed or emotional
employees are at risk of exploitation from the unscrupulous employers
which are inevitable in the workplace. It is unlikely that a severance
agreement waiving FMLA rights will constitute a fair bargain benefiting
the nation’s families where employees are likely tending to essential
needs at home, are not fully aware of their FMLA rights, and have a
noted lack of bargaining power. Even more importantly, individual
private FMLA waivers diminish the rights that other employees perceive
the Act to afford. The more that coworkers witness uncompensated or
unsanctioned violations of FMLA rights, the more likely the employees
are to yield rather than assert the rights to which they are entitled. Thus,
waivers give obvious incentives for employers to violate the Act.
Fostering employee acquiescence to these violations hardly encourages
utilization of leave options so that employee-family members may
participate in early childrearing or care for seriously ill family members.
Endorsing waivers actually discourages use of leave options, which in
245. See supra note 226, discussing Silverstein, supra note 61, at 486. A severance
agreement will contain no ameliorative provision as they are largely form contracts
provided by the employer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. See David Sherwyn, Samuel
Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1563–64 (2005) (noting that rarely
negotiated policies also include health insurance, life insurance, pension plans,
noncompetition agreements, vacation pay, and mandatory arbitration).
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turn hinders efforts to minimize the potential for employment discrimination246
and simply does not promote the stability of families. 247
The anti-waiver approach of illegalizing FMLA waivers advances
many public policy aims and is an appropriate interpretation of section
825.220(d). A viable alternative, rather than the anti-waiver approach, is
to require a court or the DOL to supervise a proposed severance agreement
waiver for fairness. This scheme does not impossibly stretch any administrative
framework; 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b) explicitly states that FMLA complaints
of violations should be resolved “in the same manner” as FLSA complaints
are resolved,248 and the DOL has supervised waivers in the past. 249 The
least that can be done to better protect employees and the effectiveness of
the Act itself is to implement strict waiver requirements, perhaps similar to
those in OWBPA, to safeguard employees’ well-being. 250 Changing
nothing and treating FMLA waivers as ordinary private contracts is not a
well-reasoned path, as in the end waivers serve to reestablish the choice
for employees between “the job they need and the family they love.” 251

246. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000) (including among FMLA purposes the goal to “to
minimize[] the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring
generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons (including maternity-related
disability) and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis . . . .”).
247. The statute provides:
Congress finds that . . . it is important for the development of children and the
family unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing
and the care of family members who have serious health conditions . . . . It is
the purpose of this Act to . . . balance the demands of the workplace with the
needs of families, . . . to promote national interests in preserving family
integrity . . . [and] to entitle employees to take reasonable leave . . . for the care
of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition.
Id. § 2601(a)–(b).
248. Id. § 2617(b); see supra note 228 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
251. Clinton Signing Statement, supra note 25.
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